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Plaintiff's Exhibit 1: Edited Lease Agreement
dated 6th day of June, 1984 by David Baldwin,
Gloria Baldwin and Ada Jones.
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dated 1st day of August, 1992 by David Baldwin and
Ada Jones.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3: Letter dated May 7, 1993
to David Baldwin RE: Tender signed by Ada Jones.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4: Letter dated June 9, 1993
to David Baldwin RE: Answer to letter asking for
a determination on the possible sale and
separation of a home and business using the same
commercial hoop up signed for Mark G. Nelson,
Pres. Bolder Farmstead Water Co. by Elaine Roundy,
Sec. for Mark Nelson.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5: Letter dated June 10, 1993
to Billie RE: Billie's tender on the property for
sale enclosed is letter from Bolder Farmstead
Water Co. (Exhibit 4, Addendum) and the withdrawal
of offer for sale of said property.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12: Letter from State of Utah
signed Sandra K. Allen, Attorney Division of
Environmental Response and Remediation to Jackson
Howard RE: Jones/Baldwin Matter (Facility No.
6000678, Release Id. EIWY Burr Trial Cafe, Highway
12 Bolder, Utah) Dated November 2, 1995.
Defendant's Exhibit 23: Letter to Billy from Dave
RE: tentative price quote for the entire property
@ $32,000.00 mailed December 2, 1992.
Condensed Transcript pages 658-667.
Annotation-Requisite Definiteness of price to be
paid in event of exercise of option for purchase
of property.
1 Williston, Contracts, (3rd Ed. 1957) §41.
Judgment of the Verdict by Plaintiff.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by
Plaintiff.
Partial Judgment and Decree by Plaintiff dated
19th day of December, 1995 by Honorable Don V.
Tibbs.

First Amended Partial Judgment and Decree by
Plaintiff filed with Garfield County on 3-8-96
dated 6th day of March, 199 6 approved by Timothy
Miguel Willardson, Attorney for Defendants.
Judge's continuation instructions Instruction 9-21
dated 3 0th day of November, 1995.
Judge's Preliminary Instructions Instruction 1-8.
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions dated
Wednesday, November 22, 1995 signed by Timothy
Miguel Willardson, Attorney for Defendants.
Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions.
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LEASE "AGREEMENT

THIS A G R E E M E N T , made and'entered

into

this

J u n e , 1 9 S 4 , by and between DAVID BALDWIN, hereinafter
as the "' ^^'•". '"^frafrfrft

to ^ u

...f_'l l1 ' * « ^ and'"ADA JOrLEi-r-^frc&ina*te^- r e ^ T

..-——r&it^r^
ferred

"s/err-od

l

""

to'as the "Lesseet ' r S * i N E S S E T H :
That the Lessor hereby

leases to tne Lessees certain
located

in B o u l a e - ,

res-

taurant

and service station property

Garfield

County,

Stats of Utah, upon the following terms and c o n d i t i o n s : ^

?? (tr
I.

Tne term o(f this Lease shall be from June 1, 1 9 C ^

t h r o u g h May 21, 1 9 S 5 , inclusive.
option

Lesseei

to "enew this Lease for successive

uo to a total of ten (10) ye"ars.
ne has fjll rignt and authority

snail

have the e x c l u s i v e

two-year

te^ms

Lessor covenants

tnereafte-,

and w a r r a n t s

tnat

Ml-

to enter into this Lease f A g r e e m e n t , ,,!/

for the full
hereof.
* £ ? ' /two-year
i^tf
2. term
During
the y*--**»-^
term of tn^s .ease, the
rental

to oe paid by the Lesseei

month.

be the sum of ?~^jg—• pj^f%

Thereafter, the amount of such r e n t a l ^ h a l l

re-negctiaticn

of twenty percent

v
rental
. ****?'
M ^ 7 ^amount04r
' t / : ^-,^..- -r--~£T
* p f ^ o'e ^Xir aa io~n t h*~
'*r

'3.
successive
purchase

At any time a u n n g

renewal

conaitions:/Vof

parties

shall

yo
- > c t — w , ','- / ' •

,

r

-£_,/j
^<

the term of this L e a s e , or any

^ 0 ZXC**J

O v ^W

-

d

^ C

t e r m s and

WT u , ^- V - o ^ c ^

be f^xeC,

The p u r c h a s e price shall

by mutual

c L o U

^

at that time, 3t s*p

by the opinions of tnree

a o o r a i s e r s , to be selected

(2) in-

agreement of tne

hereto.
3.

Lessees

(20*) above tne initial

and p r o p e r t y , upon the following

fair m a r k e t value, as e s t a b l i s h e d
dependent

not i n -

t e r m s , Lessee* may exercise a first option to

the oremises

A.

bc""sub:act to

among tne p a r t i e s , but, n e v e r t h e l e s s , snail

c r e a s e more tnar a total
cite

shall

One-half of the a g g r e g a t e

sums paid as rental

u n o e r tne terms of this L e a s e , computed

as o f tnat

by the
aate,

be aoDlied as a down payment, toward the p u r c n a s e o n c e of

said premises and p r o p e r t y , and shall
C.

The r e m a i n i n g

at that time by mutual

be credited

terms of such purchase

agreement of the parties

according 1 )'.
shall

be e s t a b l i s h e d

hereto.

4VY

A.

n

4.

In a d d i t i o n to the rental

specified

herein,

a g r e e - t o . pay j*l 1 uti 1 i ti es . and w a t e r c h a r g e s , and

5. - L e s s e e s

shall be e n t i t l e d

Lessor^ shall

m a i n t e n a n c e or r e p a i r s
5.
ises
the

be

entitled

to m a k e i m p r o v e m e n t s

the p r e m i s e s and. p r o p e r t y , and agree t o ' m a i n t a i n
and o r d e r ,

shall

Lessees

remain r e s p o n s i b l e

upon

them in good

ijid l i a b l e for

repair

any..major
^Z/2P

upon the p r e m i s e s and p r o p e r t y ^ * — v « *

L e s s o r shall pay the real p r o p e r t y

and p r o p e r t y , until

taxes x upo-n jthe.p.refn-

Lessees e x e r c i s e t h e i r o p t i o n to

purchase

same.
7.

L e s s o r shall

a d e q u a t e fire and h a z a r d
Lessees

shall p r o v i d e

personal

i n s u r a n c e upon the p r e m i s e s

and

times

property.

their own i n s u r a n c e for t h e i r i n v e n t o r y

and

p r o p e r t y u p o n the p r e m i s e s .
8.

assign

retain and keep in f o r c e at all

Lessees

their i n t e r e s t

shall

have the right to sel^»

transfer,

or

u n d e r this L e a s e , after f i r s t o b t a i n i n g

the

c o n s e n t of the L e s s o r .
9.
Lessor

At r e a s o n a b l e t i m e s , and upon r e a s o n a b l e

shall be e n t i t l e d

necessary

Lessor

to inspect the p r e m i s e s , and to

repairs and m a i n t e n a n c e
10.

under the t e r m s of this

r e s e r v e s the r i g h t , after n i n e t y

this L e a s e ; to r e - e n t e r and t a k e

thereof

to the o b l i g a t i o n of the L e s s e e s

Lessees

agree to v o l u n t a r i l y

Lease,

(90) d a y s n o t i c e of s u c h

of the p r e m i s e s ; and to re-let the s a m e , and a p p l y the
hereunder.

possession
proceeds

In that

event,

vacate and s u r r e n d e r the p r e m i s e s , and

to r e s t o r e them to as good or better c o n d i t i o n

11.

perform

thereon.

In the e v e n t of d e f a u l t

d e f a u l t , to t e r m i n a t e

notice.

as w h e n they

If e i t h e r p a r t y , for good c a u s e , d e s i r e s

to

took

terminate

t h i s L e a s e , they m u s t f i r s t p r o v i d e w r i t t e n n o t i c e to the o t h e r
partyi
posed

at least n i n e t y

(90) days p r i o r to

t.ermi nati on.
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the d a t e of such p r o -

12.

Lessees agree

s t a t e , and;1 o c a 1.1aws< and
13.
Agreement,

If. legal

such.action,

1s. t a k e n

party

shall

including

14. -Tit.1s e x p r e s s l y
the-very

Lease

15.

contains

the

This L e a s e

representatives,
D A T E D this

shall

BALDWIN

\=> L o ^ ; c C2> c'^d

Lot s / ^

o^f^-"

and a g r e e d

in w r i t i n g ,

that

in c o n fees.
time

is of

signed

b e t w e e n the
by D o t h

and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e

parties.

i n u r e to
heirs,

and a s s i g n s .

d a y o f June,' 1 9 8 4 .

LESSEES:

LESSOR:

DAVID

attorney's

be b i n d i n g .upon, and shall

successors,
/?

reasonable

ofrthls

incurred

the entire agreement

b e n e f i t o f , the p a r t i e s ' h e r e t o ,

legal

p a y all c o s t s

terms

Agreement.

p a r t i e s , and m a y only be m o d i f i e d ,
16.

to e n f o r c e ' t h e

understood

e s s e n c e of this
This L e a s e

federal,

ordinances.

action

the d e f a u l t i n g

nection.with

to c o m p l y wi th_ a I.I.. app 1 i c a b I e

MARILWN

HANSEN

^

^ w ^

as RdCo^dUjr^-

<bavRxM

fv^ssev^ C c a w e ^ / , ^ / " w
•
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ADDENDUM 3

May 7, 1993

To:

David Baldwin
717 Country Plaza South
Gilbert AZ 8523^
H^DER

By this document, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-27-1, et. sec.. I tender to you, pursuant to provision
3A of die lease agreement between us, dated August 12, 1992, the purchase price of the premises as
mav be established bv three independent aonraisers.
In respect to the appraisal I am willing to work with you to select the appraisers or I am
willing to select one, have you select one, and have the appraisers so. selected select a third.
In respect to the purchase price, I will pay cash for the price determined and will expect to
receive title by a Warranty Deed with Tlrie Insurance to ALIA standards.
The deed to me must warrant that the property is free from environmental hazzards and will
meet the Federal and Utah State environmental requirements.
As an alternative to appraisal, I am willing to pay S40,000.00 for the property, that being
what I believe to be the fair market value.
I wouid like to close the transaction within thirty days at a tide company or law office of your
choice, and I am willing to deposit the purchase price with such firm upon acceptance of this Tender.
In the alternative I am willing to have my attorneys, Howard, Lewis & Petersen at 120 East 300
North. Provo, Utah 84604, complete the documentation, or if you prefer a tide company, I wouid
recommend Provo Land Tide Company at 255 East 100 South. Provo, Utah 84603.

Box 1391
Boulder, Utah 84716
AJ/lm
j:jones.itr

ADDENDUM 4

Boulder, Utah
-rips a

i Q G :

Mr. David Baldwin
?
: 3ox 1402
Ecuidar, Utah 84726
Dear David;

In answer to your l e t t e r of June 2, 1392, asking
for a d e t e r m i n a t i o n en the p o s s i b l e sale and separation of a heme and business using the same
commercial hook up.
This i s a problem we have not had to address. As
ycu suggested to s p l i t one share which c o n s t i t u t e s
a membership and c r e a t i n g two shares or two memberships i s something we c a n ' t do a t this time because
of lack of suffleant water.
Therais a l s o a waiting l i s t for memberships r i g h t now;
and we a r e no longer taking membership r e q u e s t s . We
shall look seriously a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n and address
i t , if i t i s p o s s i b l e . We can see zhat in the future
this could create a'problem for others who have home
and business being served by t h e same membership.
If you s t i l l have questions about this matter, feel
free to contact us a t anv t i m e .
Sincere Recrards,
Mark G. Nelson, P r e s .
Boulder Farmstead Water Co,
Elaine Roundy Sec.
for Mark Nelson

/rr* 4
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ADDENDUM 6

NCW-22-1995
U/02/95

IS:5? FROM

HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN

18:28 FAX 801 358 8853

U

TO

13315751963

DIV ENV RgSP REM

B002/003

State of Utah

! DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALTTY
I DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION
Mk*i*J 0. L*ovitt
COVtRMU
t % NWIWD,

Ph.D.

B«twtM D*aor
Kiwi P. Oruy
ttnct*

[
I
1
I
f

168 Nonh 1950 Woaf
P.O. Box 144940
SattUte City, Utah 84114-4*0
(SCI) 53M10O Voice
(101) 3594SS3 F *
($C!J53W«4TD.0.

ERRA-083-95
Novembers 1995

Jackson Howard
Howard, Lewis end Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
P.O, Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Re;

P. 32-^34

Jones/Baldwin Matter (Facility No. 6000678, Release W. SIWY
Burr Trail Cafe, Highway 12 Boulder, Utah)

Dear Mr Howard:
As we discussed yesterday, Robin Jenkins is the current project manager for the above referenced
leaking underground storage tank sice. Ms. Jenkins has reviewed the above referenced leaking
underground storage tank file. Gary Astin is an environmental scientist responsible for underground
storage tank compliance. Mr. Astin hasreviewedthe underground storage tarik compliance file for the
above referenced facility. Their reviewsreflectedthefollowinginformation.
Uadermmd Storage Tank Compliance File Review bv Gary Astin
My review indicated that there appears to be two underground storage tank* based upon exposed product
pipes above grade remaining after the removal of the dispensers. The tanks ere regulated under the Utah
Underground Storage Tank Act ("Act"). The tanks are not in compliance with the Act or with the
regulations implementing the Act, To be in compliance the tanks would have to be properly closed or
upgraded- Proper closure would entail taking samples by a certified sampler. If closure samples indicate
contamination, an investigation of the extent of the contamination must be performed. A corrective action
plan must be prepared and implemented. Under the Act the owner or operator of the underground storage
tanks may be ordered to do this work. In addition, theresponsibleparties* as that term is defined in the
Aet» iuay be apportioned a share of the cost Finally, the owner or operator of the tanks is required to pay
registration and petroleum storage tank fees. The amount owed for fees for this facility is $1546,72
currently. If the tanks are promptly and property closed, there is a possibility that the petroleum storage
tank fond fee portion of $3710.00 would be waived.

Gary ^tut/cnvitocxrjental Scientist

HTA !
Prima* on ftvyctod paper

JO

11/02/93

15:27

FAX 401 3*9 6«U

My

W

HBP B a

(21003/003

Facility ID. #6000678, Release Id, EIWY
Page 2

leaking Underproiind Storage Tank Site File Review bv ttohm Janttni

My review of the leaking underground storage tank case file indicated that a release was reported at this
facility on April 3, 1995* According to the spill report, Frandne Peerer phoned the Division of
Environmental Response and Remediation to report that she has observed product emanating from the
diesel dispenser island. Under the Act and implementing regulation*, the owner or operator of the tanks
is responsible for performing a site check to confirm the suspected release. If appropriate, the owner or
operator is then responsible for investigating a release to define the extent and degree of contamination,
for preparing a corrective action plan and cleaning up the release. Other responsible parties may be
apportioned a share of the costs.
In response to the spill repoTt this agency issued a request for site cheek to the property owner on reccfti,
Mr. David Baldwin, Mr, Baldwin had a certified sampler, Tosha Hcyt, take samples. The soil sample
taken from directly adjacent to the island, two feet below tie surface, showed non-detectable
concentrations of the gasoline and diesel constituents analyzed The soli sample appears to have been
properly taken. An above ground water sample was also taken but ^16 not satisfy the regulations which
require that a representative ground water sample be collected. Based on the sample results, there appears
to be no surface soil contamination associated with the open product pipe, but the samples do not indicate
whether groundwater is contaminated or not* Tte absence of detectable water contamination is not
representative of groundwater and does not indicate whether contamination is present at greater depths and
distances from the source. As a cautionary note, please understand that contamination is often detected
during closure when samples are taken at deeper levels The absence of contamination in the soil sample
taken by Ms. Hoyt should not be relied upon as evidence thai contamination will not be detected during
closure because the sample was taken from a shallow depth.

Lvixonmental Scientist
I trust that this information satisfies your request and that Mark Bertefecn's appearance on
November 9,1995 will not be required.
Sincerely,

Sandra K. Allen, Attorney
X>ivision of Environmental Response and Remediation
SKA/al
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ADDENDUM 8

Page 658-661

Compressed Transcript

Page 658

Page 659

[ 1]

[ 1]

reads that estimating report, even assuming it was on the

to that

[ 2] right property and even assuming that it wis based on things

[ 2]

[ 3]

that were reliable and assuming that there is some

[ 3J

And Mr. Howard made a good representation. He

[ 4]

obligation to sell the property, there is still the problem

[ 4]

the tender at all. He said that there were two subjects

[ 5]

that on that report itself, it said that the cost of the

[ 5]

covered in that letter. He was never asked what the two

didn't say that that response to the tender doesn't cover

( 6]

property itself is significantly more than the valuations

[ 6]

subjects were. Furthermore, it talks to the tender and it

( 7]

that are being used. It says that the cost of the land and

[ 7]

talks about the $320,000 offer. And it also talks about the

[ 8]

the buildings is $51,600, and these plaintiffs are asking to

[ 8]

lack of the ability to split the water.

[9]

sell the property for less than it would cost to build.

[ 9]

[10]

Furthermore, the agreement, if there is one and if

[10]

Now it is true it doesn't say that I disagree that
the price you suggested is correct, but it is a matter

[11J

one can decide what it is, the two written documents-or the

[11]

suitable for judicial reckoning and it's also a matter of

[12]

tender and the last written document, and I believe the

[12]

testimony before this Court, judicial recognition. It's a

[13]

first written document, also requires three appraisers.

[13]

matter of testimony before this Court that the availability

[14]

Three appraisers have not rendered an opinion.

[14]

of water has a crucial impact on the price of property.

[15]

Mr. Baldwin certainly, at least by implication,

[15]

With respect to the tender, that alone should

[16]

defeat any call upon equity. That tender offer was drafted

[16]

objected to the price of that. And as to the terms of the

[17]

by an attorney, Mr. Howard. It was sent by him to a person

[17]

tender, the unanimous testimony, including of the plaintiff,

[18]

whom he knew was not represented by counsel and it

[18]

is that none of those were ever discussed.

[19]

referenced the wrong CODE provision.

[19]

[20]

Now it's true that you and I and Mr. Howard know

[20]

In addition to the points that I've just made,
every single point that I made in my motion at the close of

[21 ]

that lawyers now that et sequentes latin means "and the

[21]

the plaintiffs case also applies to rebut the arguments of

[22]

following". Mr. Baldwin testified that he doesn't know to

[22]

the plaintiff.

[23]

this day yet what it means, accept now he's just learned.

[23]

[24]

That CODE provision says nothing about what is required from

[24]

[25]

a tender and Mr. Baldwin made a good faith offer to respond

[25]
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THE COURT: Now you said you wanted to make a
motion to dismiss. Just as well make it now.
DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS
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[ 1]

and the tender was never rejected for any reason. We submit

testimony of Mr. Mark Nelson and the evidence produced at

[ 2]

it, Your Honor.

trial, we move to dismiss the plaintiffs case for failure

[ 3]

to join the indispensable party, specifically Mr. And Mrs.

[ 4]

Church. They're indispensable because of the testimony they

[ 5]

are owners of the water, and the plaintiff is asking the

[ 6]

MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, based on the

[1

MR. WILLARDSON: I find in highly ironic.
THE COURT: I find it unusual, but go ahead. Go
ahead.
MR. WILLARDSON: The plaintiff is claiming that

Court to deprive the churches of that ownership of that

[ 7]

the lay-unrepresented Baldwins are chargeable with knowledge

water.

[ 8]

of latitude and in all arguments of the law.

MR. HOWARD: One or two small comments, Your

[ 9]

Honor. In the first place we did cite the right section of

[10]

the statute. It pertains to tender. All that whole chapter

[11]

pertains to tender and that's why I did it in this fashion.
Secondly, we never said and intended that it had

THE COURT: Now are you gonna argue that? You've
already argued that once.
MR. WILLARDSON: Just a moment. On the one point

[12]

they don't know what their own tender is. All the

[13]

requirements of assurance require that survey, and that

to be surveyed. I've read that over. I can't see where

[14] requires a survey.

that said that. Counsel talks as if that's in the tender

[15]

THE COURT: Do you want to speak again?

offer, but it's not. I don't know where we get these

[16]

MR. HOWARD: No.

things. But the point is that we have responded to the

[17]

motion for summary judgment. It's an adequate response and

[18]

THE COURT: I appreciate it, folks.

totally addresses every issue that's before the Court and I

[19]

It's my responsibility to make rulings upon the

COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS

repeat, we're entitled, I believe, on the basis of the

[20]

completion of the evidence and that's what I intend to do

evidence to the ruling of this Court that the plaintiffs

[21]

at this time.

entitled to specific performance.

[22]

The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. The

The terms of the contract are adequately

[23]

plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on all the issues

delineated. There's no question about the property to be

[24]

of fact by clear and convincing evidence on the request for

sold, purchased. Everyone knew what we were talking about,

[25]

a judgment of specific performance is granted. It's my
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[ 1]

understanding that I must make finding of fact in order to

[ 2]

justify this order. So I want to make findings of fact at

[ 3]

this time. I will ask both counsel to bring to my attention

[ 4]

any issue that they want a finding on, because I think

[ 5]

under the law, I must make finding of fact

I [ 1]

that Ada Jones has been in possession, has operated that

[ 2]

property continuously up until the time she was evicted from

[3]

the premises, which was in—I can't remember now—

I [ 4]

MR. HOWARD: February, 1995.

[ 5]

THE COURT: All right February of 1995. The

[6]

So I will start doing it and then I'd appreciate

[ 6]

Court finds that during that period of time she was in

[ 7]

your courtesy in bringing any issue that you want me to make

[ 7]

possession of this property, under EXHIBIT NO. 1, and

[8]

a finding on. Now this will be in the finding of fact by

[ 8]

thereafter, under EXHIBIT NO. 2, she made improvements in

[ 9]

the Court, which I will ask Mr. Howard to prepare, based

( 9]

the property. She built up a business on the property. She

[10]

upon the order I'm making at this time.

[10]

developed a clientele on the property and it was a going

[11]

business.

[11]

The Court finds that Ada Jones and David Baldwin

[12]

and Gloria Baldwin, the parties in this action, entered into

[13]

a lease agreement as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 1.

[14]
[15]

The Court finds that that agreement was modified
on at least two occasions as the testimony indicates.

[16J

The Court finds that the parties knew the property

[12]

The Court finds the parties subsequently entered

[13]

into an agreement, as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 2, which

[14]

purports to be a lease, also, although it's designated by

[15]

the grant; that Mr. Baldwin is the grantor and Mrs. Jones is

[16]

the grantee.

[17]

and the description of the property and that the plaintiff

[18]

went into possession, under EXHIBIT NO. 1, that there was

[18]

agreement you must compare it with EXHIBIT NO. 1 and that

[19]

not a cafe operated on that property when she went into

[19]

the Court finds that the defendant Mrs. Gloria Baldwin was a

[20]

possession and that she and another woman by the name of

[20]

party to EXHIBIT NO. 1, received the benefits under EXHIBIT

[21]

Mrs.-

[17]

The Court finds that in order for understand this

[21]

NO. 1, and that she authorized her husband, the other

[22]

MR. HOWARD: Marilyn Hansen.

[22]

defendant, to enter into an EXHIBIT NO. 2; that she received

[231

THE

[23]

the benefits of EXHIBIT NO. 2 throughout the length of

[24]

The Court finds that Marilyn Hansen sold her

[25]

COURT: -Marilyn Hansen went into possession.

interest out to Ada Jones probably approximately in 1985 and

[24]

EXHIBIT NO. 2; that she used the money that she, at least in

[25]

the summer time, was right next-living right next to the
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[ 1]

premises, went to it, and ratified the entry into that

[ 1]

[ 2]

agreement and received the benefits. And it would not be

[ 2]

before the lawsuit, that both sides had an opportunity to

[ 3]

fair to allow her to say, "Well, I didn't know anything

[ 3]

bring appraisers before the lawsuit or before this court to

The Court finds that based upon the evidence

[ 4]

about it," and get out of it. The Court finds that her

[ 4]

determine what fair market value of the property was and

[ 5]

husband, the other defendant, held himself out as being her

[ 5]

the Court finds that the fair market value of the property

[ 6]

agent and the Court finds there was such an agency.

[ 6]

is $40,000 and the Court finds in an if I don't accept that,

[ 7]

[ 7]

I would, in essence, defeat the intent of the parties in the

payments through the years at various times and places, but

[ 8]

exercising of this contract. So the Court finds that the

( 9]

it became a pattern for the parties to accept paid

[ 9]

$40,000 is a fair market value of this property.

[10]

delinquencies and for the defendants to accept delinquencies

[10]

The Court finds, by the testimony, there's

[11]

and at the time of the tender in May of 1993, that the Ada

[11]

taxes in arrears on this property which there's no evidence

[12]

Jones was current in her payments and all of those payments

[12]

before me, but the Court enters an order of specific

[13]

had been accepted by the defendants.

[13]

performance and if there are any taxes on arear, after a

[ 8]

[14]

The Court finds that Mrs. Jones was delinquent in

[14]

period of 30 days, then the plaintiff is given the option of

[15]

conformity with the law, that there was no justification for

[15]

paying the taxes and it will be credited against the

[16]

a refusal to comply with the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, and the

[16]

purchase price.

[17]

Court finds that the defendants refused to comply with the

[17]

[18]

option; and the Court finds that although EXHIBIT NO. 2 is

[18]

[19]

ambiguous in places, that the only way it can be construed,

[19]

[20]

reading paragraph 3, is that the plaintiff had a right to

[20]

[21]

purchase the property to make an option on the property.

[21]

[22]

The Court finds that a tender was made in

The Court finds that the defendant's refusal to

The Court finds further the defendant acknowledged
by EXHIBIT NO.MR. HOWARD: It's 7, isn't it, Your Honor? 6 or
7?
THE COURT: -NO. 6, by a letter dated August 1st,

[22]

1993, that the plaintiff was to be entitled to a credit of

[23]

appoint an appraiser was an act in breach of this contract

[23]

$15,036 against the purchase price, and I give her a credit

[24]

and left the plaintiff with only the remedy of filing a

[24]

on that amount

[25]

lawsuit, which the plaintiff did.

[25]

. M. LiddelL RPR
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The Court finds that-
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I [ 1]
[ 2]

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, that was through July
31st

[3]
[ 4)

THE COURT: I understand. The Court finds that
was through July 31st of 1993.

[ 5)
[6]

The Court finds that there are issues of damages
to go to the jury and these are the issues:

[ 7]

No. 1. Is the plaintiff entitled to any

I [ 1]

h's up to the the defendant to furnish the plaintiff the

I [ 2]

water hookup. If that is not furnished within a period of

1(3]

30 days, then the plaintiff may obtain their own water

I [ 4]

hookup and the cost of obtaining same will be assessed

I [ 5]

against the purchase price or the plaintiff will be awarded

I [ 6]

judgment for said—

I [ 7]

[ 8]

additional damages for the credits on the agreement from

I [ 8]

[9]

July 31st, '93.

I [ 9]

MR. WILLARDSON: Pardon me. Plaintiff would be
awarded judgment for what?
THE COURT: For the cost of the water hookup if

I [10]

the defendants haven't given it to them. I'm sure I said

[11]

whether or not Ada Jones should be compensated for the rent

I [11]

this, but I'm gonna say it again. The Court finds that the

[12]

she had to pay, after she was evicted. The Court finds

I [12]

language in exhibit NO. 2 is consistent with an option to

[13]

there's an issue of damage on whether she should be

I [13]

purchase and is inconsistent with a first right of refusal.

[14]

compensated.

I [14]

And the Court finds there was no offer that even

I [15]

necessitated a right of refusal.

[10]

The Court finds there's an issue of damage on

[15]
[16]

MR. HOWARD: Would it be for the difference of
what she would have made against what she did make?

[16]

Oh, further, the Court finds that the defendants

[17]

as owners of the property, have an obligation under the law

[18]

compensated for her damages on what she could have made,

[18]

to make the property environmentally safe in conformity with

[19]

less what she made for the time that she has been

[19]

their agreement to sell and that if they fail for remove the

[20]

dispossessed of the premises.

[17J

THE COURT: That's right. If she should be

pi J
[22]

The Court also reserves the attorney fee issue as
an additional offset.

[23]

The Court further finds that this agreement and

[20]

tanks and make the property environmentally safe, then the

[21]

plaintiff may do so and the cost will be assessed against

[22]

the purchase price or the plaintiff will be given a judgment

[23]

for that amount.

[24]

option contemplated that there would be water with the

[24]

[25]

premises and the plaintiff is awarded a water hookup and

[25]

I will set a time. How long do you want me to set
the time for?

Page 669

Page 668
( 1]

MR. HOWARD: Removal of the tanks?

[ 1]

description, if counsel is opposed to conveying to us a

[ 2]

THE COURT: That's right.

[ 2]

description that he received. I'm satisfied with the

[ 3]

MR. HOWARD: I would think-how long do you say,

[ 3]

description he received. I recognize there may be some that

[ 4]

counsel? How long will it take you?

[ 5]

MR. WILLARDSON: Well, it's winter. It's the

[4]

has been conveyed out to the State of Utah. We would accept

[5]

the difference, but if you want a survey, I'm willing to do
that.

[ 6]

remote location. That kind of hazardous waste remediation

[6]

[ 7]

has to be done by people who are certified by the EPA.

[7]

[8]

THE COURT: I just asked for time.

[ 9J
[10]

MR. WILLARDSON: I think one year would be
reasonable.

[ 8]
[9]
[10]

MR. WILLARDSON: We don't want to spend any more
money than is necessary.
THE COURT: All right Um accept the
description then.

[11J

MR. HOWARD: I think that's far too long.

[11]

MR. HOWARD: We'll prepare the description.

[12]

MR. WILLARDSON: They have been in the ground

[12]

THE COURT: All right. Now this-maybe the

[13]

since 1968.

{14]
[15]

THE COURT: I'll just add it on. There's got to
be some time given on it. I'll give the defendants an

[13]

record should indicate that this court is decreeing this

[14]

decree of specific performance, but I'm decreeing a good

[15]

marketable title. If there are any outstanding liens,

[16]

opportunity to remove the tanks and place them in the

[16]

judgements, debts on the property, they shall be cleared by

[17]

condition that it can pass an inspection by July 1st of

[17]

the defendants, or if the plaintiff has to pay funds to

[18]

1996. And the Court reserves the right to grant a judgment,

[18]

dear them up, then they should be awarded a judgment for

[19]

if the plaintiff has to pay for that, because the defendants

[19]

the amount she expends.

[20]

haven't done it.

[20]

[21]

Now I've gone rapidly, I realize, but I want to

MR. HOWARD: In order to get a good marketable

[21]

title, Your Honor, today's market environment, a title

[22]

cover alt facts that you both you want rac to make a finding

[22]

insurance policy is required. That's how we establish the

[23]

on.

[23]

marketable title. That's satisfactory to us.

[24)

Do you have anything else?

[24]

[25]

MR. HOWARD: Yes, I am willing to survey a new

[25]

MR. WILLARDSON: That's-and there's never been
any evidence that that's traditionally paid by the seller.
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It can easily be paid by the buyer.

( 2J

THE COURT: Well, I'll solve that right now.

I [ 1]

his offer because he couldn't provide the water, and also by

I [ 2]

the contracts themselves which both EXHIBIT 1 and EXHIBIT 2

[ 3]

There's nothing in the contracts talks about title

I [ 3]

provided that all water should be paid by Ada Jones, that

[ 4]

insurance, but there is about the title being good and so

I [ 4]

based on that fact and the testimony of the Boulder

[ 5]

the Court will order title insurance to be placed upon the

I [ 5]

Farmstead Water representative that the water was

[ 6]

property. Each party pay one-half of the cost of the

I [ 6]

appurtenant and was intended to be appurtenant to the land.

[ 7]

policy.

[7]

[ 8J

MR. HOWARD: All right.

[9)

THE COURT: But all liens should be removed. The

[10]

title should show good marketable title.

[11]

Now it seems to me that I'm missing something, an

I [ 8]

MR. HOWARD: You want a finding that the water is
appurtenant. It seems to me, Your Honor-

[ 9]

THE COURT: I hesitate to make a finding.

[10]

MR. HOWARD: It would seem to me that furnishing a

[11]

connection to the property by the defendants, aftcr-for
the furnishing the connection, that if the water company

[12]

issue on damages, and I can't put my finger on it. So I'm

[12]

[13]

gonna reserve the right for take a look at the damage issue

[13]

takes the position that they can't divide the water, that

[14]

in the morning when we get together when I prepare the

[14]

the water connection to the premises to the plaintiffs

[15]

proposed instructions. So you both be thinking about that

[15]

premises shall be remain intact and that the division will

[16]

and that will give me a chance to think about it, also.

[16]

have to come to the defendant's house until such time as the

[17]
[18]

MR. HOWARD: May Mr. Daynes suggest something to
you?

[19]
[20]

MR. DAYNES: May I suggest a few other findings,
Your Honor.

[21]

[17]

water company is willing to provide a division of the water

[18]

connection.

[19]
[20]

THE COURT: Yes. I was gonna ask that.

[21]

THE COURT: Well, the Court makes a finding that
this water has been used on this cafe for in excess ofMR. HOWARD: 20 years.

[22]

MR. DAYNES: Okay.

[22]

[23]

First, one suggestion that I have would be

[23]

the water shall still be used on the cafe and that there

[24]

regarding the water, that by clear and convincing evidence,

[24]

will be a water connection available to the cafe and that's

[25]

according to the letter that's been stated where he withdrew

[25]

the responsibility of the defendants. If they fail to do

THE COURT: -20 years, and the Court finds that
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[I]

so, then plaintiff may get a water connection and I'll add

[ 1]

[ 2]

it on to the judgment and I'll put a lien on their water

[2]

[ 3]

connection. Well, maybe I can't. Maybe I can't do that.

[ 3)

[ 4]

Well, in the event the defendant fails for get a water

[ 4]

allocation of the water may not all be used by the cafe, but

[ 5]

connection, then the water connection that's on the property

[ 5]

that some reasonable fraction thereof must be available to
the defendant's house? And I would suggest a finding.

[ 6]

at the present time shall be used first for the cafe and

[ 6]

[ 7]

second for the house.

[ 7]

[ 8)
[ 9]
[10]
[II]
[12]
[13]

MR. HOWARD: Thank you.
THE COURT: I'll leave that up to the defendants
to straighten that out.

[ 8]

THE COURT: All right. Do you want me to make
some findings now?
MR. WILLARDSON: May we have the finding that the

THE COURT: I think I'll go along with that.
I'm-I'm going to make a finding one-half of the water

[ 9]

connection shall be used by the cafe, one half by the house;

[10]

and if the irrigation company doesn't like it, they'll have

MR. WILLARDSON: May we have a finding that the-

[11] to try and do something about it.

THE COURT: Let me just keep here until they're

[12]

MR. HOWARD: Okay.

[13]

THE COURT: That's the order. I don't think they

through and then I'll come over, counsel.

[14]

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, let us cogitate

[14]

have the right to terminate the water right, period,

[15]

overnight. We'll come back with a clearer head in the

[15]

regardless of what the president says.

[16]

morning, if we want to make some-

[16]

All right? Any other thing you want?

[17]

THE COURT: Additional findings.

[17]

[18]

MR. HOWARD: -additional finding. And I would

[18]

first Could you restate what your first finding, with
respect to the issue on damages to go to the jury is—

[19]

suggest we could meet as early as 8:30, if that satisfies

[19]

[20]

the Court.

[20]

[21]

MR. WILLARDSON: Um, I need some clarification,

THE COURT: First, I think there's an issue on the

THE COURT: That's agreeable.

[21]

amount of credit against it from July 31st of 1993, to the

[22]

MR. HOWARD: We can work on this.

[22]

present. But there is a whether or not she should be

[23]

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other you

[23]

allowed any credit for the funds paid since that time.

[24]
[25]

want to bring up at this time?
MR. HOWARD: Not at this time.

[24]

The second one is—

[25]

MR. WILLARDSON: The rent paid after eviction.
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[ 1]
[ 2]

amount of rent-

[ 3]

MR. HOWARD: She didn't receive.

[ 4]
! [ 5]

Page 675
THE COURT: Yeah. Should she be entitled to the

THE COURT: -she didn't receive from her house,
because of her eviction. That's the second one.

[ 6]

The third one-oh, the exhibit, the loss,

[ 7]

difference between what she earned and what she could have

[ 8]

had if she had stayed on the premises.

[I]

THE COURT: AH right. Does that help?

[ 2]

MR. WILLARDSON: Yes, Your Honor. We request that

[ 3]

all of the issues, with respect to reformation of the

[ 4]

contract, be submitted to the jury.

[5]

THE COURT: Well-

[ 6]

MR. WILLARDSON: We request a finding.

[ [ 7]

THE COURT: I don't need a finding. My decree,

[ 8]

what I've already decided, has decided that. So it will not
go to the jury. I've made these findings of fact.

[ 9]

MR. HOWARD: Right.

[9]

[10]

THE COURT: Now is there any other?

[10]

[11J

MR. HOWARD: No.

[II]

requesting finding to be asked the jury as to ail of the

[12]

THE COURT: That's what I think. There was

[12]

elements of the plaintiffs case.

[13]

something else.

[13]

[14]

MR. HOWARD: Well I -

[14]

[15]

THE COURT: I'm not sure there was any evidence on

[15]

[16]

to anything else.

[17]

MR. HOWARD: Here we are. This is the exhibit on

MR. WILLARDSON: Just for the record, we're

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's denied.
MR. WILLARDSON: Also, for the record we're
objecting to all of the findings that have been made-

[16]

THE COURT: Now, counsel, let me just say listen

[17]

to me a minute. I asked you if there are any findings of

[18]

damages, Your Honor. I think that covers the entire amount.

[18]

fact you want me to make. You know it's hard enough for a

[19]

You reserved the questions of attorneys fees.

[19]

Judge to make a ruling, so I don't want to go back and

[20]

rehash this thing. I want you to, if you have some facts

[20]

THE COURT: So the loss of earnings, the house

[21]

rental, less loss of earnings, and Dan's market. There are

[21]

you want me to find, tell me what they are. I'll tell you

[22]

three issues that could go to the jury room. I'm reserve a

[22]

whether I'm find them or not, because I'm required, under

[23] right to take a look at that tomorrow when we start

[23]

the law as I understand it, to make finding of fact.

[24]

preparing instructions, if there's anything else.

[24]

MR. HOWARD: All right

[25]

[25]

MR. WILLARDSON: I'd like the same privilege
that's been granted to the plaintiff to reserve final answer
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[ 1]

[ 1]

on that.

Thank you very much. We'll see you tomorrow

[2]

THE COURT: That's fine.

[ 2]

[ 3]

THE COURT: So before we start in the morning, if

[ 3]

MR. WILLARDSON: May I ask one additional thing?

[ 4]

THE COURT: Surely.

[ 4]

you've got any additional findings you want me to make,

[ 5]

please submit them to me that. Write them down so I know

[5]

[ 6]

what we are talking about.

[ 6]

morning at 8:30; all right?

MR. WILLARDSON: This is an extreme hardship on
light of the Baldwins. They're gonna need every penny they

[ 7]

MR. HOWARD: Okay.

[ 7]

need. Mr. Baldwin is only authorized to be off work through

[ 8)

THE COURT: Just make it a memo.

[ 8]

today. May they not be present tomorrow? I'm not asking-

[ 9]

Do you want me to make a particular finding?

[9]

THE COURT: I don't have any objection, if they're

[10]

You see, there might be something, Mr. Willardson,

[10]

not present, but I think it's a mistake. I can tell you

[11]

that you want to make a record on that I've missed, and I'm

[11]

this on the record. I think that's a mistake. This jury is

[12]

willing to make a finding so you can make your record on it.

[12]

going to go in there and be asked. And I'm not gonna force

[13]

But if I can't think of it now, I'd rather have it all on

[13]

them to come, but I think it's a mistake if they're not

[14]

the record.

[14]

here, so that's the only way I can answer that

[15]

MR. WILLARDSON: Okay.

[15]

MR. WILLARDSON: Thank you Your Honor.

[16]

THE COURT: All right?

[16]

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else? We'll be

[17]

MR. HOWARD: That's fine.

[17]

[18]

MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor-

[18]

[19]

THE COURT: So you'll understand what will happen

[19]

[20]

now, what I intend, because I'm making-this is a final

[20]

[21]

order that the plaintiff will prepare findings of fact,

[21]

[22]

conclusions of law, and an order, based on what I've decided

[22]

[23]

at this point, and so this is the time that we should make

[231

[24]

those things. And the only thing I'm sending to the jury is

[24]

[25]

on the issue of damages. All right?

[25]

in recess till tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m.

[WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE
COMPLETED]
-ooOoo-
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ADDENDUM 9

ANNOTATION
REOUISITE DEFINITENESS OF PRICE T O BE PAID I N EVENT OF
EXERCISE OF OPTION FOR PURCHASE OF PROPERTY

§ 1. Scope and related matters:
[a] Scope, 702
[b] Related matters, 702
§ 2. Summary-:
[a] Generally, 702
[b] Practice pointers, 703
§ 3. Specific price, or mode for ascertaining price, provided for in agreement, /03
§ 4 Provision containing maximum or minimum price, 706
_
;
__
8 5 Agreement containing no provision respecting manner of ascertaining price, /UB
§6. — Pre-emptive right as implying price at which others are willing to buy,
or at which optionor is willing to sell to others, 710
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702
PURCHASE O P T I O N — D E F I N I T E N E S S — P R I C E
2ALR3d
§l[a]
2 ALR3d 701
§ 1. Scope and related matters
Validity of sales contract as affected
r*l Scope
ky provision therein giving buyer power
t is a well-established principle of the to control price to be paid for goodslaw of contracts that it is essential to 49 ALR2d 508.
die validity of any contract, including
Escalator price adjustment clauses,
an option agreement, that a definite 63 ALR2d 1337.
price either be stated in the contract or
Validity and enforceability of contract
be ascertainable from the contract's ex- which expressly leaves open for future
press or implied provisions. In this agreement or negotiation the terms of
annotation it is sought to collect the payment for property, 68 ALR2d 122L
cases dealing with the problem of
whether a price provision contained in § 2. Summary
an option agreement is definite enough r a i Generally
to render the option agreement enforceThe time-tested rule of contract law
able.1
that in order for a contract to be enIn defining the scope of the annota- forceable it is necessary that the price
tion, the term "option" has not been either be specified in the agreement or
used in a pure or technical sense ex- a mode provided whereby the price can
clusively, but also in a general or broad be definitely ascertained is of course
sense covering rights of "first refusal" applicable to option agreements, and
or "pre-emption," as well as the strict such requirement is fulfilled where the
"preferred option" right However, contractual provision clearly provides
cases involving an option to purchase at such definite price or mode of ascertaina price actually offered to the optionor ment.4 Thus, provisions in an option
- a third person are not within the scope agreement which state that the price to
wi this annotation.1 Also excluded are be paid by the optionee for the property
cases which deal with options containing shall be the same as that at which the
provisions for the price to be fixed by optionor offers it for sale to another,
arbitration or appraisal.8
or that the price to be paid shall be the
[b] Related matters
Cases discussed in any of the following
annotations of related interest which
also fall within the scope of the present
annotation are repeated herein:
Validity and enforceability of provision for renewal of lease at rental not
determined 166 ALR 1237.
Indefiniteness as to terms in option
for extension or renewal of lease. 172
ALR 421.
Validity, construction, and effect of
contract, option, or provision for repurchase by vendor. 44 ALR2d 342.

fair market value of the property at the
time the option is exercised, have been
held definite as to price, and the options
have been enforced.5
It has also been held that an option
to purchase at a price to be agreed
upon, but not to exceed a specified
sum, is a definite fixing of the price, and
such an option may be specifically enforced.6 However, in the two cases
found where the provision in the option
agreement stated a minimum price to be
paid, while leaving the purchase price
open to future negotiations, opposing re-

1. The annotation supersedes one in 117
ALR 1095, except that part of the annotation
-vhich is covered in 136 ALR 138, as indiated infra, footnote 2.
2. See the annotation on the subject of an
option to purchase at a price offered to the
optionor by a third person, in 136 ALR
138.

3. See the annotation on the subject of
specific performance of a contract or option
as affected by an unexecuted provision for
determination of the price by arbitrators or
appraisers, in 167 ALR 727.
4. §,3, infra.
5. §3, infra.
6. §4, infra.
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suits were reached under the circumIn the event the contract of one seekstances.
ing to obtain specific performance of a
^
On the other hand, option agreements pre-emptive right states no price or mode
have generally been held unenforceable of ascertaining it, the argument of his
for lack of definiteness of price if the counsel should be directed to the freparties both fail to provide for a spe- quently recognized theory18 that it is
cific price to be paid for the property, implied by the mere granting of preand also fail to specify a practicable emptive rights that the price may be
mode by which the price can be deter- ascertained by reference to what third
mined with certainty by the court with- parties offer, or what the seller asks on
out any new expression by the parties the market, and of course he should
themselves.8 Nevertheless, it has been attempt to show that the optionor did
held in a few cases that the option place it on the market at a particular
agreement need not make any mention price at least, if not accept an actual
of the price to be paid, nor provide offer of a third party at a particular
for a mode whereby the price can be price. Of course, counsel for the party
ascertained with certainty, and the op- resisting performance should emphasize
tion agreement will still be specifically the strictness of the well-established genenforced.9 In some cases, the basis of eral rule that a definite price or means
such enforcement has been that the of ascertaining it is an essential element
agreement provided for a pre-emptive of a valid and enforceable option.14
right which, although granted without
stating any definite price or mode of * 3 - Specific price, or mode for ascerascertaining it, carried an implication
taining price, provided for in agreem ent
that the price to be paid was either the
.
price which others were willing to pay,
Option agreements have generally
or the price which the optionor was b e e n h e l d or recognized to be sufficiently
willing to take, and that the agreement d e f i n i t e M t o P r i c e to justify their enwas therefore sufficiently definite with forc ernent if either a specific price is
respect to price.10 However, in at least P r o v i d e d f o r ^ the agreement or a
one case the particular language grant- Practicable mode is provided by which
ing the pre-emptive right was held not ^ P r i c e c a n b e determined by the
to carry the implication described above, c o u r t without any new expression by
and the court refused to enforce the ^ P a r t i e s themselves.
agreement.11
Cal—Stockwell v Lindeman (1964)
... _
.
229 Gal App 2d —, 40 Gal Rptr 555.
[b] Practice pointers
Conn—Didriksen v Havens (1949)
The obvious moral for the draftsman 136 Conn 41, 68 A2d 163.
presented by the cases within the scope
HI—Haves v O'Brien (1894) 149 111
of the present annotation is that if the 403, 37 NE 73, 23 LRA 555; Folsom
parties desire their option or pre-emptive v Harr (1905) 218 111 369, 75 NE
agreement to be certainly enforceable, 987.
the price at which the property may
La—Price v Ruston (1931) 171 La
be purchased should be stated with cer- 985, 132 So 653.
tainty, or a clear and specific mode of
Md—Hagan v Dundore (1945) 185
ascertaining it should be provided."
Md 86, 43 A2d 181, 160 ALR 517;
PURCK

JE OPTION—DEFINTTENESS—PRIC*.

Z' I \' P ^
o c c •!*"
y. § o, intra.
10. § 6, infra.
n J K ? 1 1 5 v D a I t o n Motors > I n c - ( 1 9 6 1 )
260 Minn 124. 109 NW2d 51. infra 5 6.

12. Several examples which have held up
" a c t u a l litigation appear in §§ 3 and 4,
infra.
13. § g, infra.
H. See especially
F
Y cases in §8 5, infra.
'
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PURCHASE OPTION—DEFINTTENESS—PRICE
2ALR3d
§3
2 ALR3d 701
Foard v Snider (1954) 205 Md 435, premises at a price not to exceed the
109 A2d 101:
sum of $12,500, and the agreement also
NH—Kann v Wausau Abrasives Co. stated that the purchase price would
(1925) 81 N H 535, 129 A 374; R. F. be subject to any amount remaining
Robinson Co. v Drew (1928) 83 NH due on a $5,000 mortgage on the prem459, 144 A 67.
ises, it was held in Didriksen v Havens
NJ—McClung Drug Co. v City (1949) 136 Conn 41, 68 A2d 163, that
Realty & Invest. Co. (1919) 91 NJ the agreement was not so uncertain as
Eq 216, 108 A 767, affd 92 NJ Eq to price as to preclude the plaintiff
237, 111 A 926; Gutch v Meccia (1948) lessee from obtaining specific perform142 NJ Eq 430, 60 A2d 649 (recogniz- ance of the option contract The court
ing rule that it is not necessary that the concluded that since the agreement in
price be specified in figures or words effect provided that the plaintiff should
if the contract provides a standard by pay the agreed price less any amount
which the price may be determined that might be due on the mortgage when
with certainty).
the option was exercised, there was no
NY—Cortese v Connors (1956) 1 such uncertainty as would violate the
NY2d 265, 152 NYS2d 265, 135 NE2d statute of frauds, the amount due on
28.
the mortgage would be fixed and defiJurgensen v Morris (1920) 194 App nitely ascertainable, and the provision
Div 92, 185 NYS 386; Saleh v Karp was within the rule that the essentials
(1961) 13 App Div 2d 706, 214 NYS of the agreement must be specified in
2d 472.
the contract itself, or that some mode
Garelik v Rennard (1921) 116 Misc for ascertaining the essentials of the
352, 190 NYS 371; Brandenburger & agreement must be provided in the
Marx, Inc. v Heimberg (1942, Mun Ct) contract.
34 NYS2d 935.
An option contract containing IanOhio—Mose Cohen & Sons, Inc. v guage to the effect that if the party
Kuhr (1959, CP) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 453, of the second part should desire to
85 Ohio L Abs 302, 171 NE2d 207, sell the building involved, the party of
affd (App) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 460, 171 the first part should be given the opNE2d 216.
tion and preference of purchasing the
Va—Parker v Murphy (1929) 152 same at the price at which it would
Va 173, 146 SE 254; Rolfs v Mason be offered, was held in Price v Ruston
(1961) 202 Va 690, 119 SE2d 238, 2 (1931) 171 La 985, 132 So 653, to be
ALR3d 695.
specifically enforceable. The court was
W Va—Casto v Cook (1922) 91 W of the opinion that although there was
Va 209, 112 SE 502.
no price specified in the option contract
Wis—Goerke Motor Co. v Lonergan
> **« P r i c e w o u l d be ascertained
(1941) 236 Wis 544, 295 NW 671 ^ ^ certainty when the building was
(recognizing rule that the failure to offered for sale; and that therefore the
name a purchase price in an option language of the option contract met the
agreement does not render the agree- requirement that there be provided in
ment void for uncertainty and indefinite- **« agreement at least a mode for ascerness if the agreement provides the man- tailing the price with certainty before
ner by which the price, is to be ascer- a c o u r t m a Y &&** specific performance
of a n
tained or can be determined).
OP*011 contract
An option granted to plaintiff by a
Where the lessors, as part of the provision in an agreement establishing
consideration for a lease, granted to the a partnership at will, whereby the plainlessee the option to purchase the leased tiff was to have the first opportunity

2ALR3d
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53
to buy out the defendant partner's inter- mine, the price to be later determined
est "for a sum not exceeding the book by outside circumstances, such as invalue of the share" of the defendant creased costs of production, the base
partner in the partnership, was held in figure to remain at $45 a ton over the
Hagan v Dundore (1945) 185 Md 86, whole 5-year period. The court took
43 A2d 181, 160 ALR 517, to be definite the position that the price was capable
as to price, and enforceable. The court of judicial ascertainment, and was theretook the position that the language in fore sufficiently definite to enable the
effect meant that if the optionor would court to specifically enforce the option
not accept less than the book value agreement.
of his interest, he must accept the full
i n Cortese v Connors (1956) 1 NY2d
book value of that interest The court 265, 152 NYS2d 265, 135 NE2d 28,
concluded that the fact that no date the court held specifically enforceable
for determining the book value was an option clause in a lease which proprovided for in the option agreement v ided in effect that the lessee was to
did not make die agreement any less have the first option to purchase the
certain, because the objecting optionor leased premises, under the terms at
had his choice of having the book value w hich it should be offered for sale. The
ascertained at the date of the exercise c o u r t w a s apparently of the opinion
of the option, or at die date die op- that die price was definitely ascertaintionee paid die purchase price.
able, and would become certain when
An option agreement whereby the die premises were offered for sale by
grantor of a certain farm retained the die lessor.
right to repurchase the farm and the
I n S a l e h v K a r p ( 1 9 6 1 ) 1 3 A p p Div
personal property, within 6 months of 2d 706, 214 NYS2d 472, the court held
die date of sale, for a price correspond- enforceable an option agreement which
ing to die reasonable evaluation of the w a s p a r t 0 f a rider attached to a conproperty as determined by the parties, t r a c t for fac absolute sale of a number
based on the consideration paid for the 0 f \ots a t $ 2 00 a lot, even though within
land, plus any and all improvements the option agreement itself there was no
made by the grantees and all sums ex- p r i c e e x p r e s s l y stated for the lots covpended by the grantees for the improve- e r e d b y i t j w h e r e t he agreement conment of the stock and farming equip- t ^ g d a provision which contemplated
ment, was held by the court in Foard that a further contract was to be made
v Snider (1954) 205 Md 435, 109 jf ^ o p t i o n w a s exe rci S ed, the proviA2d 101, to be specifically enforceable. s i o n a k o s t a t i n g t h a t s u c h c o n t r a c t
The court took the position that al- "shaU be in identical form as the within
though there was no price stated in contract" The court took the position
the option agreement, the computation that the effect of diese provisions was
of the price was a matter of mere to incorporate into the option part of
mathematics, and tiierefore, tiiat the the contract die $200-a-lot price conpnce was definitely ascertainable and tained in the other parts of the contract,
the option contract specifically enforce- ^d accordingly the option agreement
able
*
was held to be complete and enforceable
In Kann v Wausau Abrasives Co. by the court.
(1925) 81 NH 535, 129 A 374, the
The COUrt in Mose Cohen & Sons,
court held valid and enforceable a 5-year l n c . v Kuhr (1959, CP) 13 Ohio Ops
option agreement whereby die optionee 2d 453, 85 Ohio L Abs 302, 171 NE2d
was given die right to purchase die 207, affd (App) 13 Ohio Ops 2d 460,
excessive output of die optionor's garnet 171 NE2d 216, stated tiiat an option
[2 ALR3dJ—45
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contract in which the corporate defend- a sufEciently definite price to permit
ants granted to the plaintiff the right enforcement of the agreement
for 5 years to purchase from the d o
Where an option clause m a kase
ndants any or all sheet iron purchased provided that the lessee had a right
bv defendants, at the market value then to purchase the building at any time
prevailing in the Cincinnati market, was during the term at a price not to
not invali on the ground of uncertainty, exceed $2 5 0 0 i t w a s J y k m Trotter
because a fixed price could be deter- v Lewis (1946) 185 Md 528, 45 Ajd
mined by the parties to the option 329, that the price provision was not
contract The court was of the opinion invalid as indefinite and lacking in mu-.
that the fact that the market value tuality, since it was to become binding
snisht fluctuate each day or each week on both parties when the optionee exS d not mean that the sheet iron did ercised the option. The court concluded
not have a determinable fair market

^

^

^

t

^

^

X

l e d f i c performance of an option clause 7, 113 NW 779, the court held that
n a \cL which provided that if the an option contract which gave the
w « l moDertv should be offered for lessee an option to purchase at a price
S S t S S k S at any time during not to exceed $75 an acre was no,
the lJase the lessee should have the uncertain as to the price to be paid
? • n ^ r t u m t v to buy the property for the land, and the option contract
2 " t h e ^ p r i c f and t * £ at which it was specifically enforced by the court.
L S beP o f f e r S to others. The court The court concluded that under Hie
f n n n \r7ntiTsatisfied that the Ian- contract terms fixing a maximum price
T m o d e by which the price for the
property could be ascertained with
Saini
7
*
+
However, in Sharkey vLarkins (1873)
S2 OT623 the court, although deemL ^ u n T e c e ^ to answer the quesS i whSher £ option clause in a
1 . TiTtinT in effect that the lessee
M W
a rieht to purchase the
r m t s e ^ d u r i n g l e termPof the lease
?
?TTm
t^be determined by the value

of the lessee to purchase upon payment
of that amount.
An option providing that the optionee
would have the right to purchase certain property at a price to be agreed
upon, but not to exceed the sum of
$16,500, was held in Kastens v Ruland
(1923) 94 NJ Eq 451, 120 A 21, not
so vague and indefinite as not to support specific performance, notwithstmding * a t the contract contemplated
entering into another and more definite

the certainty of the price provisi

^

^

^^

S 4 Provision containing maximum or
' nunimum price
An option to purchase at a price to be
J « d J £ n out not to exceed a speci^ f u n f h ^ b l e n held to provide for

i n a l e a s e s t a ting

in an

option clause

that the lessee should
have the privilege of purchasing the
leased premises for a price not to exceed $3,000 at any time during the
term of his lease was s u f f i o e n ^ defi-

2 ALR3d
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nite as to the price to be paid for of some other person. The court conthe premises should the lessee desire eluded that although it was true that
to exercise the option, and was there- the purchase price was not specified
fore specifically enforceable. The court in the contract in the first instance, the
took the position that even though the contract did appoint a mode for deagreement stated that the purchase price termining the price, and the price was
was not to exceed $3,000, the lessee had determined according to that mode, that
an absolute right to specific perform- is, the lessees agreeing to purchase the
ance of the agreement by offering ex- property at the price fixed by the lessor,
actly $3,000 for the property.
a n c j t hat therefore the contract was perIn Crotts v Thomas (1946) 226 NC feet and complete in all respects, as
385, 38 SE2d 158, the court granted if the purchase price had been origspecific performance of an option clause inally fixed in the writing. See also
in a lease which stated that the lessee Didriksen v Havens (1949) 136 Conn
should have a right to purchase the 4 1 j 68 A2d 163, supra §3, reaching
leased property if it was offered for ^ s a m e r e s u l t
sale at any time during the 10-year
term, at a price to be agreed upon,
In
which price in no event should be more
^ t w o following cases the courts
than $150 per acre. The court took ^ve arrived at different results on the
the position that an option to purchase problem of whether a price provision
at a price to be agreed upon, but not m a n option agreement which states a
to exceed a stated sum, is definite and minimum price to be paid, while leaving
certain as to the price provision, and *he purchase price open to future negowill be specifically enforced by a court tiations, is definite enough as to price
of equity. The court concluded that to be enforceable.
the optionee could exercise the option
In Purdy v Carlson (1953) 118 Cal
at the stated maximum price without App 2d 526, 258 P2d 94, the court
any further negotiations with the op- stated that a clause in a lease providtionor in regard to the price to be paid ing that the lessee was to have the
for the premises.
first
option to purchase the premises at
An option clause in a lease stating a price of not less than $20,000, did
in effect that the lessees were to have not fix any definite price to be paid
the first privilege of buying the leased in the event of the exercise of the
premises on terms to be agreed upon option, and that therefore such an opat the time such agreement was made, tion clause, standing alone, was unenthe purchase price not to exceed $15,000, forceable.
was held by the court in Parker v
However, in Hunter v Farrell (1913)
Murphy (1929) 152 Va 173, 146 SE 42 New Br 323, 14 DLR 556, 13 East
254, to be -definite and certain as to LR 354, the court denied the defendthe purchase price and specifically en- ant's contention that the price provision
forceable. The court construed the Ian- in an option agreement that the opguage in the option clause to mean that tionee should have the option of buying
in the event the lessor decided to sell the building for not less than $10,000
his property at any time within the was too indefinite and uncertain as to
term of the lease, the lessees should price to be specifically enforceable, and
have the first right to buy it at the construed the language in the option
price the lessor was willing to take from agreement to mean that the optionee
anyone else, whether the price was fixed , had a right to exercise the option for
by the lessor himself, or by the offer exactly $10,000.
\CHASE OPTION—DEFINITENESS-

RICE

r

08

PURCHASE OPTION—DEFINITENESS—PRICE

2 ALR3d
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; 5. Agreement containing no provision the land for sale, he would afford the
sspcctlng manner of ascertaining lessee the first opportunity to buy. The
price
parties did not agree upon a specific
It is a generally recognized rule that price for the property involved, nor
t an option agreement neither contains did they provide for a mode whereby
L provision specifying the price, nor the price could be ascertained with cer>rovides for a mode whereby the price tainty, and the court concluded therei n be ascertained with certainty, other fore that since the contract was indefihan the future agreement of the par- nite with respect to the price to be paid
ies, enforcement of the option contract for the land it could not be specifically
hould be denied on the ground that it enforced.
s indefinite and uncertain as to price.
In Fogg v Price (1888) 145 Mass 513,
!n the following cases this principle was 14 NE 741, the court denied specific
tpplicd in various circumstances.
performance of a covenant in a lease
Where the option clause in a lease which provided only that if the premDrovidcd in effect that should the lessor ises were for sale at any time, the lessee
lecide to sell the leased premises, the should have the first refusal. The court
essee was to have the first chance to took the position that since the option
3uy the property, the court in Folsom clause in the lease neither fixed the
/ Harr (1905) 218 111 369, 75 NE 987, price, nor provided any way in which
leld that the plaintiff lessee was not the price could be fixed, the contract
mtitled to specific performance of the must fail for indefiniteness. But see
option clause, on the ground that no Shayeb v Holland (1947) 321 Mass 429,
?-' - was stated nor was any method 73 NE2d 731, infra, reaching an opDi ascertaining the price fixed in the posite result
[ease, and therefore the option clause
Relying on the rule that an option
*-as too uncertain to be specifically ^ a l e a s e t o p u r c hase is unenforceable
enforced. The court took the position w h e r e t h e r e i s ne ither a price specified,
that it is not necessary that the contract n o r a standard established by which the
should determine the price in the first p r i c e may be determined with certainty,
instance, but it is necessary that it at ^ c o u r t i n McClung Drug Co. v City
least provide a way by which the price Realty & Invest. Co. (1919) 91 NJ
can thereafter be determined, in which E q 2 16, 108 A 767, affd 92 NJ Eq 237,
case the contract would be perfected m
A 9 2 6 , held that the lessee was
only when the price had been so n o t entitled to a specific performance
determined.
of a n option clause in a lease which
In Hayes v O'Brien (1894) 149 HI stated in effect that if the lessor de<103, 37 NE 73, 23 LRA 555, the rule cided to place the leased property on
was recognized that the price is an the market for sale, then the lessee
essential ingredient in an option con- would be given 30 days' notice in writtract, and where there is neither a ing of such intention, with the privilege
specific price provided for in the con- of purchasing the property within 30
tract nor a mode provided by which days. The court took the position that
the price can be ascertained with cer- although it is not necessary that the
tainty, the contract is void for incom- price be specified in figures or words,
r^teness and incapable of enforcement, it is necessary that a standard at least
*n Wolf v Lodge (1913) 159 Iowa be established by which a price may
162, 140 NW 429, the court denied spe- be determined with certainty, as for
cific performance of an option clause instance, language stating that the opin a lease in which the lessor stated tionee would have the first chance to
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another party, or language stating that
The court in Smoyer v Roth (1888,
the price will be settled by an appraisal Pa) 10 Sadler 32, 13 A 191, 11 Cent
or by arbitration.
779, held that an option clause in a
An option clause in a lease providing lease providing in effect that the lessee
only that the lessee should have the would have first chance to purchase the
first option to purchase the leased prem- premises at a price agreed upon in the
ises if the lessor decided to sell was held future was indefinite as to the price to
unenforceable in Andreula v Slovak be paid for the premises, and therefore
Gymnastic Union Sokol Assembly No. unenforceable.
223 (1947) 140 NJ Eq 171, 53 A2d 191,
The court in Driebe v Ft. Penn Realty
on the ground that there was neither Co. (1938) 331 Pa 314, 200 A 62, 117
a specific price provided for in the op- ALR 1091, recognized that a provision
tion clause, nor was there any criterion in an option contract stating that the
or standard established by which the lessee shall have the first chance to purprice could be determined with certainty, chase the property at a price to be agreed
In Colcott v Sutherland (1932) 36 upon by the parties is too vague and
NM 370, 16 P2d 399, it was pointed indefinite to support a decree of specific
out in a dictum that if there is no performance.
price indicated in an option clause to
In Rolfs v Mason (1961) 202 Va
repurchase certain property, a court of 690, 119 SE2d 238, 2 ALR3d 695, the
equity will not hold that the parties court held that the plaintiff purchaser
are to be bound by a rcasonable^grice, was not entitled to specific performance
and will not specifically enforce the of an option clause which stated only
option contract.
that if the owner should sell the two
The court in Brandenburger & Marx, lots adjoining the tract which the puri n e v Heimberg (1942, Mun Ct NY) chaser had just bought from the owner,
34 NYS2d 935, held indefinite and un- then the purchaser would have first
enforceable an option clause in a lease choice at purchasing the adjoining lots,
providing that the tenant was to have The court took the position that the
the privilege to purchase the leased option clause of the contract neither
premises at any time within the life contained a specific price, nor provided
of the lease, for a sum to be fixed when for a mode whereby the price could be
the option was exercised. The court, ascertained with certainty. Thus, the
in arriving at its decision, was appar- court concluded, there was no agreeently guided by the rule that an option ment of the parties on the essential eleagreement must either specify the price ment of price, and therefore the actions
to be paid or provide a mode whereby of the parties did not result in a full
the price can be ascertained with and complete agreement
certainty.
An option agreement to repurchase,
Where an option clause in a lease making no mention of price, but merely
stated that the lessee might, at his op- providing that the vendor reserved to
tion, purchase the leased premises at himself the right of first option to rea price satisfactory to the lessor, the purchase the buildings at such time as
court, in Re McVoy's Estate (1950, Sup) the vendee should dispose of them, was
94 NYS2d 396, affd 276 App Div 1102, held unenforceable in Machesky v Mil96 NYS2d 686, held that such a price waukee (1934) 214 Wis 411, 253 NW
provision was merely an agreement to 169, on the ground that it neither proagree upon a price in the future, and vided that the price was to be some
was therefore too indefinite as to the specified or reasonable amount, nor proprice to be paid for the premises to be vided any manner by which the price
enforceable.
was to be ascertained or determined.
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2 ALR3d 701
The court took the position that at best price at which the optionor is willing
the option agreement was nothing more to sell, was the price intended, and
tr
an agreement to make a future whether, therefore, the requisite definiteag*wement as to an essential term which ness was established.14
cannot be supplied by implication of
The court in Brenner v Duncan
law, and that because there had been no (1947) 313 Mich 1, 27 NW2d 320 demeeting of the minds as to the price to ni e d the defendant lessor's contention
be paid for the premises, the contract that the option clause in a lease which
could be given no effect
provided in effect that the lessees would
•
be given first preference, and allowed to
In the following case, however, the purchase the leased premises if the parcourt granted specific performance of ties could agree on the price, was void
an option agreement even though there under the statute of frauds and unenwas neither a specific price provided forceable for vagueness. The court took
for in the agreement nor a mode pro- the position that the terms of the lease
vided by which a price could be ascer- imposed upon the lessor a duty, before
tained with certainty.
selling to any other purchaser, to fix a
The court in Shayeb v Holland specific sum as the amount at which she
(1947) 321 Mass 429, 73 NE2d 731, would be willing to sell the premises in
granted plaintiff lessee's bill for specific question, and to afford the plaintiff
performance of a paragraph in a lease lessees an opportunity to buy the same
which provided in effect that the lessee a t such figure.
at his option should be entitled to the
In Barling v Horn (1956, Mo) 296
privilege of purchasing the leased prem- SW2d 94, the court granted specific
b
no mention being made of the price performance of a clause in a lease whereto je paid by the purchaser, on the by the lessees were to have the first
ground that although the parties never opportunity to purchase the premises if
agreed upon any definite price or made the lessor decided to sell prior to the
any attempt to do so, and never agreed expiration of the lease, even though the
upon any specific method for fixing a lease did not stipulate a price or provide
price, the option to sell should be rea- for terms under which a price could be
sonably understood to be an offer to agreed upon by the parties. The court
sell for a fair and reasonable price. JJu£_ was of the opinion that the clause in the
see. Fogg v Price (1888) 145 Mass 513, lease was not an option to purchase in
14 NE 741, supra, reacWng^opposite a true sense, but was rather a grant of
a ri
^Lj^
§ht of pre-emption, whereby the
w
t 6. -Pre-emptive right as implying ^
f o b l i gated if he decided to sell
price at which others are willing to ]f e l a n d a t d 1 ' t o give the lessees the
buy, or at which optionor is willing first opportunity to purchase at the price
and o n
to sell to others
.
&* t e r m s that the lessor was
A number of cases have been specifi- ^ h n g to sell to another,
cally concerned with the problem
The court in R. F. Robinson Co. v
whether a grant of a pre-emptive right Drew (1928) 83 NH 459, 144 A 67,
without specification of the price or interpreted an option clause in a lease
designation of a mode of ascertaining it to the effect that if the lessor decided
carries the implication that the price at to sell the leased property, the lessee
± others are willing to buy, or the should have the preference as a pur15. For an example of a case where the
price offered to others is the expressed mode
for ascertaining the price, see Cortese v

Connors (1956) 1 NY2d 265, 152 NYS2d
265, 135 NE2d 28, supra § 3 . '

2ALR3d
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2 ALR
chaser, to mean that the lessee should
have the refusal of the property at such
price as the lessor asked, and granted
specific performance of the option clause.
The court, in arriving at its decision
that the language in the option agreement implied that the optionee was to
have the first right to purchase at the
price the optionor was asking for the
property, pointed out that the price in
the end was to be determined by the
optionor's decision, and therefore, that
the price was definite and ascertainable.
In Jurgensen v Morris (1920) 194
App Div 92, 185 NYS 386, where an
option clause in a lease contained no
mention of a specific price to be paid
by the optionee, but merely provided
that if the lessor desired to sell the
leased property before the expiration of
the lease, then the lessee should have
the first option to purchase, the court
held that the language implied that the
lessee was to be given the opportunity
to buy the property upon the terms of
an acceptable offer by a third party to
the lessor, and therefore the price was
definitely ascertainable and the option
clause in the lease specifically enforceable.
Language in a lease covenant to the
effect that in the event that the lessor
should decide to sell the leased premises
during the lessee's term, the lessee should
have the preference over the other parties, provided that the lessor and lessee
could agree upon a price and terms of
sale, was held in Garelik v Rennard
(1921) 116 Misc 352, 190 NYS 371,
to be definite as to the price terms, and
valid and enforceable. Apparently the
lessor's fixing of a specific price for which
he would sell to the plaintiffs assignor
was the factor that led the court to hold
the pre-emptive agreement definite as
to price, and enforceable.
However, in King v Dalton Motors,
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§6
LOG (1961) 260 Minn 124, 109 NW2d
51, the court held that an option clause
in a lease stating in effect that the lessor
would give the lessee the first option to
purchase the leased premises at a price
to be negotiated and to be agreed upon
between the parties at the time of sale
provided no standard for ascertaining
the price, and was therefore fatally uncertain and unenforceable. Although
the court recognized that unless the context of the option agreement indicates
otherwise, the use of "first option to
buy" or a similar expression imports a
preferential right on the part of the
lessee to purchase the leased premises
at the same price and upon the same
terms as contained in any bona fide
offer from a third person acceptable to
the lessor, the court said that in the
instant case the phrase "first option to
purchase" was not used in its ordinary
sense so as to give the lessee the right
to purchase the property at the same
price offered by a third party, but on
the contrary, the parties specifically
provided that the price was to be negotiated and to be agreed upon between
them at the time of sale, such a provision providing no standard for ascertaining the price. Although the court
recognized that there were a few cases
in which the courts had enforced an
option agreement where the parties indicated that the terms of the purchase
were to be agreed upon in the future,
the court concluded that these cases
were neither persuasive nor in accordance with the great weight of authority.16
There are a number of cases in § 5,
supra, reaching the same result as the
Dalton Case (Minn) supra, in similar
circumstances, but in which the approach taken or considered by the cases
in the present section was not discussed.
J. R. HARVEY.

16. See, for example, Brenner v Duncan
(1947) 318 Mich 1, 27 NW2d 320, supra.

Consult POCKET PARTS for later case service

contract authorizing architect to permit and for
cilitate inspection of work by owner and his
agents, to stop work if necessary to insure its
proper execution, and to make decisions on all
claims of owner or contractor and on all other
matters relating to execution of work or interpretation of contract, and provisions charging
architect with responsibility for furnishing
additional instructions necessary for proper execution of work, and empowering architect to
issue certificates for payment to contractor for"
such amount as architect derided to be properly
due, did not bestow authority on architect to
make changes in work without approval of
owner, where contract specifically provided that
changes ordered by owner must be in writing!'
Kirk Reid Co. v Fine. 205 Va 778. 139 SE2d
829.
§ 30

[2 ALR3d 689]

Contract prevailed, and contractor was not
entitled to compensation for extra work, where
contractor merely obtained approval of engineer, who was employee of owner's architect,
whereas contract expressly limited architect's
authority, and required orders for extras to be
signed by owner, or to be authorized by architect's statement that owner had approved such
work. Citizens Nat. Bank v L L Glascock, Inc.
(Miss) 243 So 2d 67.
See W. E. Garrison Grading Co. v Piracci
Const. Co. Inc., .27 NC App 725, 221 SE2d 512,
§9.
2 ALR3d 701-711
New sections and subsections added:
§ 7* Other provisions

§ 1 [2ALR3d702]
[b] Related matters
17 Am JUT 2d,'Contracts § 82; 71 Am j u r 2d,
Specific Performance §§ 37-39; 77 Am Jur 2d,
Vendor and Purchaser § 33.
Option to purchase real property as affected
by optionor's receipt of offer for, or sale of,
larger tract which includes the optioned parcel.
34 ALR4th 1217.
Sufficiency as to method of giving oral or
written notice exercising option to renew or
extend lease. 29 ALR4th 903.
Specific performance of sale of goods tinder
UCC sec. 2-7L6.26 ALR4th 294.
Determination of price under testamentary
option to buy real estate. 13 ALR4th 947.
Construction and application of UCC § 2-305

dealing with open price term contracts. 91
ALR3d 1237.
Timeliness of notice- of exercise of option to
purchase realty. 87 ALR3d 805.
^Requirements as to certainty and completeness of terms of lease in agreement to lease. 85
ALR3d414.
Equipment leases as security interest within
Uniform Commercial Code sec. 1-201(37). 76
ALR3d 11.
Lessee's first privilege option to purchase or
terms of similar import as requiring existence
of prior offer from third party. 76 ALR3d 1139.
Necessity for payment* or tender of purchase
money within option period in order to exercise
option, in absence of specific time requirement
for payment. 71 ALR3d 1201.\
Landlord and tenant: What amounts to "sale"
of property for purposes of provision giving
tenant right of first refusal if landlord desires to
sell. 70 ALR3d 203,
Sufficiency of consideration For employee
stock-option contract. 57 ALR3d 1241.
^Specific performance of land contract notwithstanding, failure of vendee to make required
payments on time. 55 ALR3d 10.
'• Construction and. application of "first refusal*'
option contained in trust instrument and relating to sale, of shares of stock. 51 ALR3d 1327.
t Landlord and Tenant: tenant's rights under
provision giving him pre-emptive right to
purchase on terms offered by third person,
where third person's offer is withdrawn before
tenant exercises pre-emptive right. 46 ALR3d
1377.
"Validity of option to purchase realty as
affected by indefiniteness of term provided for
exercise. 31 ALR3d 522.
Holding over under lease, or renewal or
extension thereof, as extending time for exercise
of option to purchase contained therein. 15
ALR3d470.
^Tenant's rights under unexercised option to
purchase as affected by landlord's breach of
lease or lease agreement. 12 ALR3d 1128.
. i: 22 Am Jur PI 8c Pr Forms (Rev), A n s w e r defense-—contract not enforceable because of
uncertainty of price, Form 18..
24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Complaint,
petition, or declaration—breach of option to
purchase—fixed purchase price, Form 36.
9 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 495, Payment
Made for Unexercised Option T o Purchase
Rather than as DownPayment.
15 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 583, Timeliness
o f optionee's notice to exercise option to
purchase real property.
19 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 543, Real Prop75

*A- In action brought by corporation agai
lending institution for specific performance <
damages for alleged breach of contract for t
construction management services* where contract contained option to buy subject real estate
at 80 percent of market value appraisal accej^J
aWe^job^thjg^nies, specific performance was
pfo^erly^Emea^oh basis ot uncertainty of
option price. Foster Enterprises, Inc. v German s Federal Sav. & Loan Asso: (1981 111 App)"
[2ALR3d703]
421 NE2d 1375. ' J ^ ^ ^ V ^ , V , / . - . - O - V c *•
Heirs of original lessor, could not avoid,
holding or recognizing option agreeobligation
under contract, notwithstanding fact
ments to be sufficiendy definite as to price to
that
in
letter
purporting to exercise optionj*
justify their enforcement if either.specific price
is provided for in agreement or practicable lessor mistakenly included incorrect purchase
mode is provided by which 'price can be deter- price* where exercise of option at price provided
mined by court without any new expression by for in lease was made clearly and unequivocally
by lessee, so that recitation of exact terms of
pames themselves: ..^, \ , ..*«.••",•*
agreement
was not necessary. Rowland v Amoco
Ariz^DaieT^
(1981, App) 131 Ariz
Oil
Co.
(1982s
Ind App) 432 NE2d 414.
!
182, 639 P2d 372. " ^,;;.'.. ;;- :.;;: . ; ; ; ' ; ; " " ' ,
Option
to
purchase
at a specific price was not
;Ga—Beller & Gould v tinsenby (1980) 246*
void for failing to specify terms of payment;
Ga 15, 268 SE2d 611. ' "
v ' > • ; • ' •;: ','•."...
when a contract specifies no terms for payment
% Tex—Moore v Dodge (1980, Tex Civ App 8th
it means fiill payment in cash. Ailstock v
Dist) 603 SW2d 236 writ refn r e . /;;'_, .',;
Hamiter (1982, La App) 420 So 2d 500.
Lease giving lessee option to purchase prop'Where it wai* provided in lease that within
erty at "fair market value" was specific enough
120 days after commencement of term of lease
to be specifically enforceable since fair market landlord would'deliver to tenant statement in
value is well-established means of property writing setting forth actual cost of land, entire
evaluation, its determination is common task building, and improvements, and that tenant
performed by courts on a daily basis, and does would have option to purchase property at 112
not require further agreement of parties. <5ood- percent of aforestated actual cost if exercised 5
west Rubber Corp. v Munoz (1985, 4th Dist) years after commencement of lease, or at 110
170 Cal App 3d 919, 216 Cal Rptr 604..
'tlf.,, percent of actual cost if exercised 10 years after
:In action by lessee for specific performance commencement of lease, and where landlord
of option to purchase real property in which thereupon furnished tenant with cost sheet
parties could not agree upon option price, trial showing that jotal cost,came-to $98,900, to
court properly ruled that correct price was pres- which tenant replied that he was shocked at
ent value of fee unencumbered by lease where amount and considered sum to be highly exorlease provision granted lessee option to pur- bitant, and where controversy was still unsettled
chase "fee tide," which term clearly stated what at time landlord sold property and assigned
interest lessee would purchase upon exercising lease to defendants* who stated they would
option, and lessor's expert witness testified that honor option only at previously forwarded cost
value of fee title unencumbered by lease was figures, trial court did not abuse discretion in
$1,684,000. Lassiter v Kaufman (1991, Fla) 581 arriving at figure.of $75,000 as cost of property
So 2d 147, 16 FLW S398.
*'
' ' ' ~ for purposes of exercising option, where it
". Where purchase option in lease contained appeared that such figure was arrived at by
specific purchase price, and where only uncer- splittirig; difference of tenant's and defendant's
tainty regarding financing arrangements arose views of what cost actually was, or by relying
when lessees offered to pay purchase price in upon revenue stamps arid title Insurance in
cash or to make whatever other financial ar- connection with* conveyance of property, a n d
rangements would prove most beneficial to such.discretion was particularly proper in view
lessors, option contract was not too indefinite, of fact that landlord-assignor had either mislaid
for failure to spell out financing terms, to be or destroyed all pertinent records and was
specifically enforced. Ford v Lord Q978) 99 therefore^ unable to prove, actual cost of constructionf However, $75,000 judgment should
Idaho 580, 586 P2d 270.
i\^f*V//% Lease provision giving lessee .option to pur- be modified in view of provision of option that
J chase- premises at any time during lease for purchase price would be 112 gercent of actual
5Kv
JL- v j "then prevailing market price" was sufficiently cost, and such modification would be accom•^ ^1 certain as to purchase price, and option agree- plished by adding 12 percent of ascertained cost
\^-\^ / ment could be specifically enforced. Miller v to cost itself. Shaya v Stein, 42 Mich App 9 1 ,
,&J*\ ' Bloomberg, 26 111 App 3d 18, 324 NE2d 207 201 NW2d 273.
In action in which grantee of option to
** ur^l (citing annotation).
erty Contracts—Specific Performance with
Abatement of Purchase Price.
.V:
AI?v.
Auto-Cite®: Cases and annotations referred to
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purchase real property sought specific performance of contract, in which option parties
agreed that purchase price would oe either sum
ottered by bona fide third-party purchaser or
price fixed by three appraisers, trial court
properly granted judgment for option grantee,
despite defendant seller's contention that
option was indefinite and unenforceable because*
•it did not specify how appraisers were to determine amount of purchase price, where parties
\ intended to commit calculation of price to third
party and to be bound by result; that agreement
provided objective standard that rendered .
option definite and enforceable. Tonkery vi
Martina (1991) 78 NY2d 893, 573 NYS2d 450.
577 NE2d 1042..
In action for specific performance by "grantee"
of option to purchase land owned by defendant
at price "equal to that offered by any bona fide
third party purchaser"'or price to be determined
by appraisal method1, trial court properly'
granted specific performance where parties
obviously intended that purchase price would
have been fair market value of parcel as established by either bona fide purchase offer or by
appraiser, so in either event, purchase price
would have been "the end product of agreement
between t h e ; p a r o ^ t h e m s ^ g s r > r i n absence of
otter TjyTSona
fide"tK^
purchaser, and
upon failure of appraisers selected by parties to
agree upon third appraiser in accordance with
contract, court, in order to carry out intention^
of parties, had authority to make finding of fair
market value. Tonkery v Martina (1990, 4th
Dept) 167 App Div 2d 860, 562 NYS2d 895,
app gr 77,NY2d 804, 568 NYS2d 912, 571
NE2d 82 and affd 78 NY2d 893, 573 NYS2d
450, 577 NE2d 1042.
Option agreement which provided that purchase price for property would be $14,000, less
sum paid for option.and any extensions or
renewals thereof, and that purchase price >vas
to be paid in installments, $700 for reimbursing
J u n e payment, $5,200 to purchase option,
$5,600 cash at time of closing, and $2,500 upon
sale of 15 acres of zoned apartment land, was
sufficiently definite as to purchase price and
time for payment to satisfy statute of frauds.
Craig v Kessing (1978) 36 NC App 389, 244
SE2d 721.
Lessee** option to purcnase at "current market value at the end of the final term," contemplated fair market value and met necessary standards for certainty of price. Portnoy v Brown^
430 Pa 401, 243 A2d 444.
84

[2ALR3d706]

Option to purchase at price consistent with
any other offer, but not less than $750 per acre;
was sufficiently "definite to satisfy statute of
frauds. Foster v Bullard (Tex Civ App) 496
SW2d 724, error ref n r e. : *
.^
;—

§5

[2 ALR3d 708]

Conditional agreement of purchase and sale
reciting that purchase price is to be a given
amount per square foot, resulting in total
purchase price of $16,470, owner to receive
$2,800 cash above real-estate commission of 10
percent, balance of purchase money payable
$100 per month/at 6 percent interest "due in
full in five years" was too ambiguous to be
specifically enforceable, on ground that it could
not be determined when interest was to be paid,
or whether amount to be paid per month on
balance included interest. Silverman v Kogok,
239 Md 71,210 A2d 3 7 5 .
§6

[2ALR3d710]

- In action by lessee for specific performance
of preemptive right to purchase real property,
trial court erred in finding preemptive right
clause in lease so uncertain as to render it
unenforceable, since preemptive rights are
unenforceable under certain circumstances,
notwithstanding absence of specific terms
regarding price, method of acceptance, or time
of acceptance; missing terms are "fixed" by the
lessor's acceptance of bona fide third-party
offer. Polemi v Wells (1988, Colo App) 759 P2d
796.
Failure of written memorandum stating purchase price is sufficient to require denial of
request for specific performance/Thus, trial
court properly refused to" order specific perfor-'
mance of real estate lease and option to pur-'
chase agreement where there was complete
absence in agreement of purchase price or
method of determining purchase price. Duke v«
Whadey (1991, Miss) 580 So 2d 1267.
?
-Fact* that no price was mentioned at which
pre-emptive right was to be exercised did not
make agreement, void for uncertainty since
words, "first refusal" implied that holder of right
could purchase at same price offered by third
party. Klein y Brodie (Mont) 534 P2d 1251.
•"—First option to buy {property] at a price to
be agreed upon in the event [owner] places the
premises for sale" provided definitely ascertained standard by which the price term could
be determined—that of an acceptable offer for
the property from a third party. Di Maria v
Michaels (1982, 4th Dept) 90 App Div 2d 676,
455 NYS2d 875 (citing annotation).
§ 7. [New] Other provisions
Under provision giving option to lessee of
portion of farmland "at the same price for which
the lessor would be willing to sell to any other
person," price would become definite if landlord, offered to sell or sold demised premises
alone to purchaser for certain price, but price
of demised premises alone did not become fixed

77

where landlord sold entire farm, including
demised premises, without separately pricing
demised premises. Myers v Lovetinsky (Iowa)
!89 NW2d 571 (citing annotation).
2 ALR3d 7 2 4 - 7 3 8
§ 1 [2ALR3d725]
[b] Related matters
i'74 Am Jur 2d, Trademarks and Tradenames
1

Jurors as within coverage of workers' compensation acts. 13 ALRSth 444. '- " ••-.-• -"] "•- - '
Workers' compensation: compensability of
injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability.
8 ALRSth 798.
Activities of insurance adjusters as unauthorized practice of law. 29 ALR4th 1156.
' •; <
' Existence and extent of right of litigant in
avil case, or of criminal defendant, to represent
himself before state appellate courts. 24 ALR4th
430.

•'

•'

• :

:

-'

-• '

"

j

:

"•:'••••.'

••

.Layman's assistance to party iii divorce proceeding as unauthorized practice of law. 12
ALR4th656.
_'v.
,../ /
h Right of party litigant to defend or counterclaim on ground that opposing party or his
attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of
law. 7ALR4th 1146. , . ; ; _ .
'.
;<Sale of books or forms designed to enable
layman to achieve legal results without assistance of attorney as unauthorized practice of
law. 71 ALR3d 1000. .. ... , . r,
-.
-i Representation of another before state public
utilities or service commission as involving
practice of law. 13 ALR3d 812. .
- .
:
Activities of law clerks as illegal practice of
law. 13 ALR3d 1137. .r
r .. .
Auto-Cite®: Cases and annotations referred to
herein can be further researched through the
~ Auto-Cite® computer-assisted research ser
vice. Use Auto-Cite to check citations fo
. form, parallel references, prior and late,
history, and annotation references.

Admissibility and weight of consumer survey
in litigation under trademark opposition, trademark infringement, and false designation of
origin provisions of Lanham Act (15 USCS
§§ 1063, 1114, and 1125). 98 ALRFed 20.
'
Parodv as trademark or tradename infringement. 92 ALR Fed 25,V^"'... ^ ; ^ ; J ; ; ^.:> , v : ,
_ Letters, initials, or numerals as common-law
trademarks. 56 ALR Fed 232. j .,-. .n.,-:,*:* •>'.:°What constitutes "false* advertising" of food
products or cosmetics within sees. 5 and 12 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USCS
secs.M5, 52). 50 ALR Fed 16. : - ^ ^ "*
' What constitutes "false advertising" of drugs
and devices within §§ 5 and 12 of the Federal
Trade Commission Acr(15 USCS §§ 45, 52).
49 ALR Fed 16. " v ° ^
: ^ i : ' ^ : c * /:~ ."•;: <•
-r Right of owner of trademark for apparel or
toiletries to protection under Lanham Act (15
USCS §1.114(1)) against infringement by another's use of similar mark for different items of
apparel or toiletries. 38 ALR Fed 374. '}-., *: .
Laches as affecting claim for accounting and
damages in federal action for infringement of
trademark or tradename; 14?ALR Fed 342. .,»•—.:.
3 Am Jur Proof of Facts~2d 577, Trade Dress
(Packaging) Simulation. ";• «• ~^\ '"•*- /.*• * NI
' 1 8 Am Jur Proof bf Facts 2d 265, Unfair competition—appropriation of competitor's advertising matter, methods, or slogan. ,~: J '
47 Am Jur'Proof of. Facts 2d 643, Wrongful
use of another's trademark or tradename.
<
14 Am Jur Trials 1, Actions for Unfair Competition—Trade Secrets/ *i :>1" c - • r :U: ..
Auto-Cite®: Cases and annotations referred to
herein can be further researched through the
1
Auto-Cite® computer-assisted research ser~vice. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for
^ form, parallel references, prior and later
- history, and annotation references.
§2

: [2ALR3d749]

Department of Citrus of State of Florida,
which had spent over $13,000,000 in advertising
and creating public recognition and good will
2 ALR3d 748-754
toward words '"sunshine tree" in. establishing
certification
mark, was entitled to preliminary
§ 1 12ALR3d748]
injunction in action against sellers of orange
[b] Related matters
juice product, being marketed.under brand
Validity and construction of state statutes name "Sunshine Tree.". Florida v Real Juices,
penalizing "criminal simulation'* of goods or Inc. (DC Fla) 330 F Supp 428. ~
merchandise. 72 ALR4th 1071.
.... rV> ,
Holder of "Honey Baked Ham" trademark
.Unfair competition: geographical extent of would be entitled to injunction prohibiting
protection of word or symbol under doctrine of competitor from using "Honeysweet Ham" in
secondary meaning. 41 ALR3d 434. < ''.n\-„-r. . ; conjunction with cooked ham products, where
Right of publisher of newspaper or magazine, evidence established likelihood of confusion bein absence of contractual 'obligation, to refuse tween products which posed substantial threat
publication of advertisement. 18 ALR3d 1286.
of harm to holder of trademark. Schmidt v
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ADDENDUM 1 0

1 Williston, Contracts, (3d Ed. 1957) §41

MAKING OF OI-'FFRS

§41

An cxpre*> promise to continue a buMncto u> ]vw. w it h
profitable or p:iy^ expenses," or to rominue an arrauyeniciil
as long as one pnrly shall "handle il saiisfaeiorily to the othr.i ."*•
hits bc«n heM tug indefinite ft« enforcement. And U pnmrisr.
to perfuitti UH long as the promisee remains in a certain husiI K ^ has also been regarded n* too indefinite.11 So a promise
to renew The phintUTs notes "until such time as the improvement in the business situation should enable him to proceed
in business without such assistance" is merely Ma hopeful encouragement sounding only in prophecy/*17 A protni.su whirh
ircnl, "when the piupcr time comes, | 1 | will buy for you." was
held tiKi indefinite Urr entorccmenftt
§ 4 L Offers Indefinite as to Price. It is by no weaiw im
^onHnotHt»Mfco£e whooffer or agree to employ others, or to
buy goods, Jo makc\no siatemcptJas to the wages or pricfr tn
be paid,1* The law invokes here (as likewise where an agree19. See pcflerally Res'- CimUiitK
8 32 -find fallowing CUKCK: Standard
14. Pulltam v Schimpf, 109 Ala nil Co. v NfarMiant, 64 V Supp bMi
179. 19 So 42S; Anderson v Vo« (DC Sn NY) mod 16.1 F2d 917, wit
Camp Sea hood Cn <>$ Cat App ?S7, den 3*.< Ub JIM, <P I cd 1149. otf
) ^
(Uf^A-**^* w
P 1<W>. to wuphty timli cm
Winn* thi agrtttiirut and hs
pierce'* ijnkhrcdfl«A lu vfnptover wu*
Hinrmlmrnu
*cre mcomplrir, iuduHPaul itr ftrtl; Drvvic v 1 luDUsiman'a
irtie
and
uncertain,
r^riir«Uily a* n»
Mm Ta ^ Mich 4 U 53 NW $25,
term* or payment, they fcvrr ren2-1 LRA -W.
dered uncnfuiccuble, Brucci'man v
Sec supra, 5 ?P.
Sold. 1Z2 C.nl App7,l g76, 265 i'.««t
15. M,uwa Hotel i,'^, v nfcXInson. 575; California Uttuw Grower*, inr
J4» A»k 188. 216 SW 104* And w Union Snjtiii Co. (Cil Ai»i»2di 27K
ace tafia. 1675A.
P2d 1(16. reversed tC':d2d) 28V P2d
16. Bastbn v Marienvilk Glass Co. 785. which held the comma in ^uic
2S1 PA 31 J. 126 A 7!tf; Norma v uas m>! niuMiry. infr^ n 1.
W^if v Aram. JW (in App 568. 77
Morehouse CTcs Civ App> 24} SW
AJfc*2d ttf» liiiMtms text) ccjipU^-meni
1104.
contract: Rr2i];di>ti w Shapiro, 146 Mr
17* H;iH v First Nat. Hk. 17> M&«
S3. 77 A2d 59R: C">^i« v Mc^thlin.
16, 33 Ni: IM. «W LKA JWfc
Luca* v Federal Re*. 15k of Rich- ?26 Mass 732. % Nl"2d 702, agreemond. SV F2d <S17 fCCA 4); Jirowij meot for nddiiiomi) coiupvnvjnon
v Fuhcy, 15/ MO 4«S, 146 A 264; *iiutt bvjvlncv; proutuble; M;irs«> >
Ycrion v Allison (Tex Civ App) 242 Tinnf, 226 Minn 540. 1? NW2«J 717.
SW 270> Spooncr v Reserve L. Ins, reasonable vahic implied
Where the contract gave a wholeCo. (W&sh2d) 287 P2d 725, crfc 44
sale dhitifniror the exclusive right u>
OU U 145,
disiribuic hakery products, reserving
18. Stewart v Johnson, 252 Mass to the h^kcry ihc rijlit w ftx priet^
287, 147 NE ft5Q,
without Selling forth any mcihoH <«r
v Walter Mack <& Sere* Co ZM
Mich 453. 250 NW 287,

f r W:ii:-i — .

~
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mcni is indefinite as to time) the standard of reasonableness.
Accordingly the hit

vnhie of ibe HTVKCS m property i«i rrcnv

arable on the contract implied in fact.11

Sometimes, however,

*iro monthly urol reasonable percentage of promisor's net profits for service* rendered by pr<mtr«c was held
too indefinite for enforcement, bin
the promisee m;iy recover on quantum
tttcmit fui Midi icrviccv subject to
limitation* and restriction* impowtl
by the contract, i-omng v Muilieud
Savarrw v Pviti« Mf& Co. !> NJ Cotamcrciul CU 112 Motil 146. II*
W , by A2d 2^7; Maiucni % Vdu^idii Kid It*.
Randall v Packard, 142 NY 4/. *h
Motor Co,, Inc. 134 Or 103. 104 P2d
1H>2, exdutivo t^lil ID *il m ir-a-toi*- NIL 823; IVtkiliv ^ HuvbtiHH'l, l".^ Hn
abio list nrlco to Ui liud; Wmdaor 4 H 2* A 6H5; Siauduid Piml Oi v
MI& Co. v Mukranslyy* 332 Pa 4<ik Dfmomt h»W. Co. K> Wu 12/, 56
MM A 84. 105 ALK 1096, approved NW 218; McNnmarn v McNumaru,
11 Temp I.Q 250; Western Newspaper 108 Wis 613. U4 NW ^al: arid Mipm.
Union, lac. v Shalt* (p<0 04 A2d 9§?6. 41.
4P3# approximately an amount per
JliuMraUons ct the rule in repaid
week held stiilkicnt.
io \IK price of (coods win be found
ITiar the objection of indefinite. in the iollONvirg decisions; Western
nc» of pikw ia obviated when there Pac. R. Corp, v W^tcrn H^ R. Co.
13 A aUnilxd ftu ttr trimming the 1<r? KM VW <C'A o, K.vU ou itdi^i
prico* we Kan-da v Karrth, 234 Wfc (TOUfutv 345 US 247. 97 I, cd 9861 73
S O 655; Shentv v Wwnrda, 73 Ala
44, 290 NW 624.
See Percrftrn v Pilgrim Vill«$«, 25o 175; Diukcrnun v Ohyshi hnpunutt
Win ftji. 4* NWM 27?, 1* Al Kfct f*u. 65 f\*l A|ip 101, 2J8 P 45H; McF-.uxn v Morey, *& W 32; Jenkins
206. find ammfntirtrt p. 2jj f «Uequj
v
Richvd«or>. (* I J Ma^h (Ky) -Ul;
KltCS M to dftSmfrnc** of agicciueitl
("onbeII v Summit thread K'tu 132
to pay employee *hare ot proh&M
Me 4U. IA7 A 79. 9: Al.R 1311. in20. JButtnttfon* of this rule in Vtffttrons; Ta/i v Irttvis, 136 M.-tsv V5;
agreements for service* may be found Loveioy v MtohcU. M Mich 15, 4*J
in the following, anions other dcci- NW 901, 13 1 HA 770.
snow; Miller v Ballerina* t35 Oal
Application L* re;ts<tji:ibtc value, «ce
56fc 67 P 104^ <£ p 600: Clark r ffilitiitci V ,Sli«. H*n*i <*k f-tiilrr li»
Clark, 40 Conn >Kte Howell v R w , 3'»?. Mi> V!?\ IKt SW.M ^'t-t.
«7 < ,wm |>y, «7 A 355; Pulmer v
Stout • CArwtberuitU IK\rdwAie
\<*lyit, 7 &oyc« <Dolj 54/, IUV A Co. 131 Mo AUM 520. 1J0 SW (319.
125; Well* v Huyfitfti, 101 Ctt R41, «
Sii W8; Loci wood v br*huu, u* P 29U; Afuntell v International Plantic
Inrf mt 2S NE 4$t; Clark v £U» llaiiivnnKAff"*Hj..141 Nl l!«j 37^r 55
wonh, \(\4 h 442, 73 NW 10?v. A2d 250, 17? AI.R i IK5; Wtlkittt v
laUi* v WKlrin (fa) 195 NW I00X; Jorkfon* 100 d i n 143, 22? P £82.
Norwood V I-athrop. !/fc Mass 20ft,
PnVr nmy jjiviw the rcnsonublc or
59 NL' 650; SCIOTO v firyant, 54 Minn
murkei price at date of delivery. Pot434, 5€ NW 58, 21 l.KA 41S; Swift ter v l.citcnbcrgcr Mae a. Co. 166 Pa
v Johnson, 175 Mo App 660, 158 SW Super 3i. 70 A2d 390.
Secen v Potts (SO) 61 NW2d 825;
Contract for payment of specified Standard Coed Co. v Stewart, 72 Utah
130
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ascertaining the price, uncertainty in
the contract wa& held to preclude the
distributor from enforcing tlic COJJrraet by injunction :tg.*tin<t sales by
bakery to anyone other than disrrihotor. MoorclaJT Dtstrih Co. Inc. v
Arnold Rakers, Inc. I Ni taper stdi,

MAKING OF OFFERS

$ 41

the terms of a promise exclude the supposition thai the reasonable or marled ptiet? was intended. 1M MU,II a case no comrnct
can arise.1 Rut the promise of an indefinite payment in addition to u dellnirr price, lliuugh unenforceable as made may be
"significant a* rebutting an aguxmetu that ifet' value was liquidated by the liquidation of the daily wage," and thus preserve
the right to recover lo tint extent the reasonable value exceeds
272, *<B ? ICI4; Accbul v T*vy, 10
Brag 376; Hoadly v MXaxnc. 10 Binfl
482; Valpy v Gibson, 4 CB $37; and
supra. I 3GA.
Several courts have upheld contracts far wlr of gomln At prices to be
later agreed upon hy il« ujjtie& .W in
M)bsMn<r pmvuimg fui u *e440nabt$
prtcc. Unliod Sum* * Swift. 270 US
I2<f 70 L «d W , 4* S Ci *M;
Abram? v Gewjn- ? Keith Cu. iO 1*
2d M <CCA */; Fujft v r.nwn. Mri
Mm Ml, HI1 to Wl, J« ALU 675:
IVtmiHiM rt loyr-c I o. v Hamilton
Furnace Co, 108 Oh St 25, 140 NF
4S5i Ettfeo* v Boyd, 130 SC 269. 125
SE 493, 36 ALR 855, For collection
of cases, 3cc 49 ALR 1464. Sec infra,
J 4$, and *4&

cho4-«* to rely merely upon the jood
faith and lairncvt of the dclcnduui
to recompense her for tlK* value of
ihc recipe* Dairi* y General Foods
Corp. 21 F sSurn 445 Civ: SD NY).
Where pcuiio attempted to awver
Jill mntwn pci ujiujift to rnmroci and
lnf* ilii/i pjjuic; MMnbi»d nf payment
tn br Agreed Upou beJuic d^llvrry,"
Ux conrt held thio pr^ented formation At crmtroct* Avaton Pnxlt« l\ v
i,cnuH PS C^J Af«|i7«l ivv, /.iv i»2d

The court in C«t*ii»» »^n i-ettucc
Growcn. Jnx-. » Uixiuii buj.v Co.
(Cal App2J> 27S P2d 106, quintet. Uio
foregoing case, the tcx; ;«ul variom
other eases eiied in the following foolrotes and wax reversed iu CCaHdl 2S9
4.t. Wilfaton, Sales CRev etf) J1GS: P2d 7K5. which hiid f>Mf contract w;i%
Prower, upon Prfr* In ftmrracr* for ri^r illaiorv, supru n 1^.
Jumc^tntrti Puittand Cement Co. v
rhA Sal* of Goadx, 16 Mfaa JLK. 73J.
fc&d NOtC. fronfltftt lit Kity <u VII Kwcwlr.. ??R Ma« \7t. 117 NF 41;
at A Prirr to ht VhtA tn the taint?, Giruj$tf W \VI)I##T. Im- v/<?v1I P.;til
27 Gil LR 70S.
i m , 1H6 Ml. 5621 Wcincf v Pictorial
1, fJcbrtrtfca Aircraft Corp Y Var* Pflpr.r Pqykaeu tiuip. 1HU M^w tM.
ney, 2X2 F oti* (CCA *), BtuuLt * 2U NIJil 4.^A. rcanonnhlc conjpcutuihoJciid Sut« Co. 24 T2d 8Q4, 37 ALR tion implied n< ciiiiitnci fui pcrma743 (App LK.*)i Kill Wiiifc Sim* O I
ucul cwploymftnt; Van Meertiwcti «
v ShcpltciJ Safely Shoe Corp. 1W r Sv/anson, 121 Mmn 2>«i, ill NW
2d 415 (CCA I) discussed m Con- J12: l^cwu v Aionuw, 77 Mnni 34H,
tract Certainty of Terms—Flexible 251 P 14/).
Price Ckiuie. 27 Tex LK $9, v,hcxc
In Sun Pufiling As^n. v Remington
price being found out definite, held Paper i u . 235 NY ,158. 139 NF" 470.
no true ofter.
rm agreement io sell poinds in the
Where defendant Agreed to exam- future which prnvklnl tlmi il* inke
ine plaintiff** recipe for fruit flavor* Of them shtwld he agreed to fi«in
'"only with flse undcntatidin* that the time to lime, bul ihould not exceed
u$e to be nude of it by m, and UK the maximum chnr$e for simitar
compensation, if aov to be paid there- fioodi by another company, vn* held
for, are marten: resting cotely in oux not a contract on the grcnml thai
i!iM.ieliifiil1v ilut Luted qifciM can- the time at which the maximum
Uaetual recovery because plaintiff should he taken wa* noi fixed.
131
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Ihc specified sum*1 On the other hand, u prumi.se may attempt
to define the price but do so too indefinitely tor enforcement,*
ns by sucb words as "not exceeding .yjoo a week/'4 the cost,
plus a "niceM profit,' a division ot profits ""upon a very liberal
t^ms/* "a reasonable amount from the prolhi^ "a portion**
of ihe promisor's estate,1 "a part of the money•"* "to reduce
the rem,""1 "a due allowance/'" "money to enable them to
cirty on their businc^ 1 * **good wages,"1* "the average priced1*
*L Von Rcitxemtein v Tomfoisoii,
219 NV 00. Id: NF 5*4. Aire. Pnj*
Slwi & Witc Co. v ttluir fca$. ( a .
?> FM JOV «vrr ilen ?7<S US *2J.
72 L cd 737, 48 S C\ $QX
AfdHMiyh A |iuifui<r tti pay **.u*
compensation *a* too mdctinit< to
bo enforceable, employee wm entilted to recover on quantum meruit
a:i execs* amount according to the
value e l hi* services, nnflrfon *
Staph*, 146 Mc 23, 77 A2d m
(quoting text).

'.in uppigpinitc t*,*iwenU£?" of d *
benefit*
Jn Cit'orfi.i O n f Piod r»t. v Tout
Trod Rcf. Co. l-*l ( U -to. wo SF. 3l«,
rhe court held: ' ine nnno^ncerocnt
i*f un fniL*mk»« io udo^r n ilhcral
y\ttit ul fM\Hii-.slMu«^/ Os^-'i nut vicait
ii ttlltliml f««i Ally tk'JixiUf jlhilJ. ill
fiHi iiny ujiatn «tiK>mil m {MopurlKiu
Of proliK or one to cORHnuc \Q? any
ecrtuifi Umc.'*

3, Dorrfc v Johoson. 363 III 2*fc.
2 NH2d 74, 104 AIR 029, holdioj;
HKI v;!£W> riftH Indefinite fi bnl of
$10,000 4i 4 WJwul *ak' U execution
deblt'ii tiwiiml n tmr4i»tlf interest and
t>iU.VUU it ftta o\vi>*i dli

Allsm v ILir^iJii^c-Mckiiiriuk Dry
Oocd^i Co. J15 M<i J54. ?K6 SW 1ft,
^•Iirt^ pluinttit u^rvct) U'irh <lcfcnd(int,
his employer, to o»r\ntt.jr .iml man
ii>v TI nmv iimiteh of the business to
wJ<iUi IT ^;i>. ;IM r*pi*U. \mtf dct'CQd
ant promised him "a fCH^l '.hjirv oi
ltt«t jtrulit\" h*4<t plfitntKT entitled to

4, Untied Pr^v, v New Ytffk |»rcxa
r*i. t A-l MV 40*. 5S ML $±t. v
LRA 2A8. ftdkmail in Sim Primlna
A*Mt. v ftcmin^ron Taper Cv, 2i>
NV 3M, H9 NT- 4?0, But Jingum

Grocery Cto. v t iiw*. w Vi dt>.\ 120
A 140, **not over 26* per lb.H meant
rciiHitriable price tt> be determined by
market conditions cxi*iini; ;IT iimr ai
delivery, but ncn in nny event to be
more than the maximum u;om'<l.

7. Ciind v Sjwilb- ^^ Misc 99,
14<> NYS ten.

50 pti vCJd. tlf Uw ifMl,«KK) ntl«llls of

llu* HniTU'ii Kiisin<*^\ under thti con*
tract. A mimniiv vi UK: COUH tiH>k
the view rh.ir fh^ IWJIMKI W ^ too
illdolinite to hv « eorur.ut ;ind tfir
Ktn^cty, there*ore, was »|»>;IM awi
tr*u*nuil.
Noble v lUJim-tl i n. :o»x Mu« 7>,
f
>4 Nl .?Hli. "a l.ui ami vH^it^i»ir
^lm« <>l act pig|'ilNM aptivJd.

5, Ciftim'* v R ? Reynold* Tv4>aeu»
CV 165 Ky 716. 17 % $W 4 « . ,v*
JJ. WuJJX Appeal. Jit I'u 1^>, .^ A
Jlubktid * Turnct Dv:pL Sturc t o
220.
<Mv App> 27$ *w IUOIK »«cr oi
9. Bunicy v Joiics, I4U CJ.I 758, 79
emptoynrcnt ai SI25 per momlj "und SE iJ40.
a purr or the protns that thrntW mean
10* 5vmim v Ankrim. 13 S«?rg A R
from $25 to 550 per mo, extra",
recovery above fixed price denied.
6, Duller v Kemmcrcr, 2IS Pa 242*
&7 A 332. Ace.. Von Rritzeaslcin v
Tomiidrto, 249 MY 60, 162 NE 5S4,
133
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12, Prwin v tiwm, 25 AJn 236.
Aue., I.g^iu y i c i i c i j ! Re*. Hk. of
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These have been held too indefinite for enforcement, But ;»
promise that another shall be •'well paid" may he enforced us n
promise for rcstsonablc- comjx'.nyation.11 V.VCH a promise lo ;m
injured workman that in case he failed to recover lib health
within six weeks the employer would "make it right'* was held
not 100 indefinite.18
——^ _ rTa promise, indefinite as to price b capable of being nuule
wrtain by an objective standard as, for example, extrinsic facts,
it h

cufttrceabltf 1 7

Kkhrmmd, 59 T2d 627 (CCA 4>.
piomi*e 10 extend *och additional accominmlatioQx m the way of discount
a* Wi>»lJ he necessary to meet the
additional btirdcitt assumed* Hui in
Stfm v Premier Shirt tlmp 2W NY
?W. 183 NE j61% pnmif*f le provide
"funds juifucicDi to curry on the bust*
rwssM upheld
|«\ Tuirplay Sehoot Township
ONctoi, !.»./ tnd ft>, 2Ct >5H. f>W.

t

lit Dr* Mtwie* Witter Wyrkx Ot. v
J>s Moinev M> In v:«, $i K W ?.r.<*.
Child* v Columbia 87 St." 209. /u
$l: 1<)K denying specxiic performance
of h;uiattn u» lurcush waiter to mmvcv'uicm at "the usual and customary
charge*," no lime being specified, te*
cawvc h uas too indefinite,
35. Vvncr* deicml.nitt orally a^ocd
to p.\v plain till fpnuuakct udditiouaJ
twnpcrmiiotu if and uteri defend*
ums* hardware b u s i n g bcromc pint*
hiihle, it u-aa Heid that it phriiuiiT*
fhiitgcx wcte tnh and reasonable, und
thf itrranju'incm u:i* foi defendant**
bnvta. defendants' promise w«w nor
void IUI ftroimd th.it it wa* loo iiidcitRile, Cygan v Menuthlin, 326 Ma»
//2« 9ti Nt:2d /"2,
Luverone v Lcvcrone, 220 Mass
W. 101 W. 527; D a w v Teachout*
\2U Mich 135, 85 NW 475; Levitt v
Miller, tr\ Mo App M7.
I*. ft varum v rmptoyeiV l i u k
Assur. Corp, 2H Ma*> 365, 100 Nit
632 wheiein the court staled? ,rThn
Jiwv mij^l haw ioim»t that under
tho wirvnmatfiitnft th* *orA> 'mnVc
ii ri^ht' uwnmi th.it in the coniia-.

peney named the pUmliiTS riucMUtr
ainuitd have fair eomrertNation paid
to him in money for the to juries-.suffered by him. . * . Hie promise
h not void o*i the proutid thm it i*
tno indelinfT^. Jwnr* uic cmivtuotly
AOIVJUB such |irobl«msfH
(t. Rird v J. !.. Pfc^eott Co. 8^
Nil J<H, 9«> A 3R0,
A proo^iv to employ "M <i livtnp.
wai^*' w v itfiltvld lw trbhe? v Kopcr
i.wm Cu. \*\ Hil -18^. IU SI- W7%
J5 AIK. 1417.
17. KnH'Ji V AndcrKim Pikh^iid 0»1
Corp. U> F Supp >?** (TX* W!) f>Ua}4
agreement to furnUh &*M.4'WC "at the
lew price for 7.^-7^ cK-tnnc ON sh<»wii**
in n spccilkd newspaper ou "itafr of
delivery" l»eld Mudmfc
Hoywp •*c!lirr,K pciec l^f ut timi>
fntuic order placed too indefinite.
Nebr.-^ka Airvtufl Toip. v Vuifltry,
2»2 T MW fC*CA H). ofiti-nt pr«Ve list,
utid W^toii fapri Mf^. «"«^. v D<»WJIin>t Uo\ To. 21.* F /25 trC'A 7).
In Mcxm Mulor O r Co. ««f N. Vv Mot>*i MflUu Cur C**. 2f> FJd 1
(Ct!A ?> hotdtor. an eat low vc tttxiicy
tMiitixict het«.ecn *«i «iioimilwlc n»at>ufactitrvr and « distributor not i&kt
indermhe. the conn observed; "Hictc
is tio Objection l<» a pnjiiiise that
it it* jnd^fmite «o luo^ n* the purrit**f cati itll ^vh<n « hny bcf«\ performed, und it ix cnooph rf, when
tlie time nrrivc*. there shall be in
cxiMcuec *mvt tfaiidard by wlm-h
that ••«« ht teMvd , • * Wh*i» the
Jwyvr urt»6i rhooAC -«tnf*ng cla.s:^ nf
dtuitflU whrrh AI« tlefjrtr«»l v< win *K
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So a promise for services thai ;i testator would leave the
promisee "full and plenty after he was gone so thai she need
not woik" was enfweed as an f»blij;atioii lo leave an amount
sufficient to buy an annuity thai would support the promisee
in the mode of life to which she had been accustomed" A
promise to bequeath "as much as to any relation on earth" was
held too indefinite by ibe same court/9 but another court round
that similar words Furnished a standard by the term* oi the
promise wliirh could be applied with cuiriness.11 And a pr unqualified by « guarantee apahw decline of market prices of coinpedtivc goods prior to the time for performance of the contract fet
sufficiently definite*1 The general view Ls thai where the price
of goods is to be fixed in relation to the official quotation of a
designated market, or to the price set by a dominant seller of
the particular kind of goods on a certain day or on delivery,
the provision controls if there is such a quotation or price set,*
whvn tbc time comes m*t ut prire*
th?n lUcd by oumctinnf. filter than
the r»fi.imjscc'* will. cxcrcuAi! m\ hoc*
lira usual nxtc IK dun aa obligation
arixa."
••tec laveson V Wurncr M f c Corp.
117 FSurr* 124 U>C D Nil.
Chicsa. l.OCtefA £ Co. v Andrew*.
61 f i d 572 (CCA 6); Sufcrrincr v
ShAnahan, 105 Neb *7\ 181 NW 53f>.
**tUc tor ptfcc ohraiiiuLtfc" M»l too
indefinite; Fountain v Fountain, a Ni
555, SS> A2d $, promise to support,
"An agreement for &alc of £***!*
which spcriltes no prk* and, thrfr
tore requires a rceoufa? to A QUIkfi tor the swccitummcm of a
rMMwaWe piicr, u a valid contract "
Franklin Sugar ttrf. Co* v I.ipowicz
M/ NY 4ft1. 160 Nfc JH6, 59 ALR
J114.
As u> contract baan fur site of
*tock at book value* $cc f w i s v fried
& Sunt. Inc. tMijc) U? NY252J 400.
s w i 281 AD *5i. t i p NYSM 2*b;
Wood V Lady ttnlT-Gordan. 222 NY
Stf, IS* NE 214;. Cuaipbrll v New
York City, 244 NY 317, 1«5 N £ e,>xt
pntvafliiitf tale of Wngi-s MI locality,
WtodMir tffg. i n v Makransky.
322 PA 4 % Iflo A $ 4 Itis Atfc ^o%,
jpprowl, U T«cap LQ 7 ^ , blanker
134

order; Dtid* v T^t l'cttii Rolty
Co* 331 P.i Super 111. 2tK> A C
t l / Ai.ft Iflvi, option in trtiv !«>
ptt'l'talS?.
Sen ii«fin 4 47«.
18. liwujfiMvn v Stevens. 71 V*
16!; j-vifU v Hiiukt <Md> ItW AM
Hit.
19, Graham v fiulam's P.xcs. 34
23. So held iti SylvcMcr'R Caac.
Pctptam 14R.
I. Salter v I.ced»m ^ Worrell Co.
??2 F HI t< CA -1i, Kinsrose Co, v
VY. & J. Sloa^r, : ; : ^ 4-ts (CCA V>.
nprctiiiciii ni seller m ,i!lurd rn<»ice
tkui j>| | 0 jvt vcM of ilu* <oKt; t . C,
Moomo Co. v Ciirtstcnirfi. M (*,^|
Apr 4/4. ??4 V 141: Miu-hclt v
CaDtfufbtt Realty ( a 121 Mc M2. 't»
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ADDENDUM 1 1

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 21,741

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADA JONES,
JUDGMENT OF THE VERDICT
Plaintiff,
Case No. 930600024
Judge Don V. Tibbs

vs.
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA
BALDWIN,
Defendants.

There is attached hereto and made a part hereof the Verdict Form executed by the jury.
On the basis of such verdict, judgment on the verdict is entered in the amount of $8,000.00.
DATED this

day of December, 1995.
BY THE COURT

DAWNA BARNEY
CLERK OF THE COURT
J:\JHUONES-JU.VER

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

TIMOTHY WILLARDSON, for:
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of December, 1995.

Timothy Willardson
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070

SECRETARY
J:\JHUONES-JU.VER
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ADDENDUM 1 2

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADA JONES,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 930600024
Judge Don V. Tibbs

vs.
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA
BALDWIN,
Defendants.

This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
Judge, sitting with an advisory jury on questions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on
matters of law as distinguished from matters of equity; and the Court having convened on the
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having ben impaneled on the 27th day of
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis &
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their

attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court
having heard testimony, and having received evidence, and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above entitled
case.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

The plaintiff, Ada Jones, together with one Marilyn Hansen, and the

defendants, David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin, his wife, on the 6th day of June, 1984, entered
into an agreement to lease certain property which is the subject of this litigation.

That

agreement is represented by Exhibit 1 in this case.
2.

On or about the date of the agreement, June 6, 1984, the plaintiff and Marilyn

Hansen entered into possession of said premises, which at that time consisted of the shell of a
motel on the north side of such premises, a storage shed, and a service station structure, all of
which had been unused and vacant for many years.

The plaintiff and Hansen made

improvements on the premises and converted the service station into a restaurant, and in a short
while were operating the premises under the name and style of the "Burr Trail Cafe". Later in
1988, the plaintiff converted a portion of the motel premises into living quarters.
3.

On or about the end of 1984, Marilyn Hansen withdrew as a party to the

agreement, Exhibit 1, and conveyed her interest to the plaintiff. The defendants' registered no
objection to the continuation of the said agreement by the plaintiff.
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4.

While no legal description was set forth in Exhibit 1, the premises were easily

demarcated and the parties all understood the boundaries of the premises. During the trial the
premises were described by a meets and bounds description as reflected on Exhibits 9 and 21,
which description is set forth as follows:
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26,
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87
acres.
5.

The agreement of 1984 was modified on two occasions, 1986 and 1988, by

making changes by interlineation, such amendments being initialed by the plaintiff and
defendant, David Baldwin. The defendant Gloria Baldwin's signature was placed on the
document in 1984 at the time the first agreement was signed. Gloria Baldwin knew of, and
approved of, and she never objected to the amendments made to the 1984 agreement and
initialed by her husband David, many, of which were made in her presence.
6.

On or about July of 1992, the defendant David Baldwin orally advised the

plaintiff, Ada Jones, that the old agreement of 1984 had expired in 1990, and therefore, a new
agreement had to be executed. While his conclusion may not have been true, Ada Jones
acquiesced to renew the written lease agreement, and thereafter, the plaintiff and defendants,
David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin, met in the Baldwin home on August 1, 1992, and the
document entitled "agreement" which is exhibit 2, was drafted by the defendant, David Baldwin
in his own hand and in the presence of Gloria Baldwin. David Baldwin selected the language

of said instrument. Gloria Baldwin read the agreement as it was drafted. When complete, it
was again read by all the parties and by the plaintiff and defendant Baldwin, whose signatures
were later notarized.
7.

The agreement of August 1, 1992, can be read as an extension of, or

modification of the agreement of June 6, 1984, because many of the terms of the first agreement
were incorporated in writing or orally into the new agreement, such as the agreement pertaining
to the accrual of one-half of the lease payments as equity to be applied to the purchase price.
8.

At all times during the creation and execution of exhibit 2, and thereafter, to

the date of trial, David Baldwin was the agent of Gloria Baldwin, acting for and on her behalf
and he specifically represented and held out that he was her agent acting on her behalf.
9.

Gloria Baldwin was fully apprised of the 1992 agreement.

She received

benefits under the 1992 agreement. Gloria Baldwin ratified the agreement by her conduct.
10.

In Paragraph 3 of the agreement of August 1, 1992, it was the intent of the

parties to create an option to purchase for the plaintiff. The language of that provision is
consistent with the intent to create an option and inconsistent with the intent to create a right of
first refusal.
11.

The plaintiff, from time to time, during the tenure of her lease, 1984 to 1995,

was delinquent in the payment of rentals, but it became a pattern for the defendants to accept
late lease payments; however, at the time of tender, in May of 1993, the plaintiff was current,
and all late payments had been accepted by the defendants.
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12.

On May 7, 1993, the plaintiff made a tender to the defendants, Exhibit 3, in

conformity with the law. The defendants refused to comply with the plaintiffs option or to
reply to her tender. There was no justification for the defendants to refuse to elect to appoint
appraisers or accept the amount tendered by the plaintiff. The failure of the defendants to
respond as required by Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-3 was a breach of contract which left the
plaintiff with only the remedy of filing a lawsuit.
13.

At the time of entering into the contract, and when defendants failed to

acknowledge the tender, it was forseeable to the defendants that damages would accrue to the
plaintiff by reason of failure to company with the tender.
14.

The plaintiff presented evidence through a qualified appraiser, that the fair

market value of the property at the date of the tender, assuming that it had a marketable title,
was $39,000.00. The plaintiff had tendered payment of $40,000.00, to which the defendants
made no objection. No evidence of value was offered by the defendants. The Court, therefore,
finds that the fair market value of the property is $40,000.00.
15.

The plaintiff stayed in possession and paid all rental payments until she was

evicted. In February of 1995, she was ejected from the premises and the defendants went into
possession, changed the name of the restaurant to the "Hitch'n Post" and began operating the
said establishment.
16.

At the time of her ejectment, the plaintiff had operated the restaurant and

property, made substantial improvements, established a gift shop, and was not in default under

her agreement with the defendants. She further had established a loyal and satisfied clientele
and had developed sizeable good will.
17.

The defendants have failed to pay certain tax arrearages. It is reasonable that

the defendants be permitted to pay all delinquent taxes and assessments within thirty days from
the date of the decree herein, or if not within that time, the plaintiff may be permitted to pay
the said taxes and assessments, at which point plaintiff will have a right to a judgment for that
amount.
18.

The defendants have some outstanding liens on other debts upon the property.

It is reasonable that the defendants be permitted to clear any outstanding liens, judgments or
debts upon the property within thirty days, or, if not with that time the plaintiff may be
permitted to pay the liens, judgments or debts, at which point plaintiff will have a right to a
judgment for that amount.
19.

The defendants, by letter, Exhibit 6, have admitted that plaintiff is entitled to

a credit of $15,036.00 against the purchase price. The plaintiff is, in fact, entitled to such a
credit against the purchase price under the terms of her agreement with the defendants. It is
reasonable that the jury be allowed to determine if the plaintiff is entitled to additional credits
to her equity as a result of rent payments from July 31, 1994, to the date she was ejected.
20.

It is reasonable that the jury be permitted to determine what other damages, if

any, were sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendants' refusal to timely comply with
the plaintiff s tender.
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21.

The water historically delivered to the premises by the Boulder Farmstead

Water Company is appurtenant to the land, but is delivered by said company on the basis of
shares owned by individual owners. The shares owned do not give the owner a certain or
proportionate quantity of water, but rather a right to water. The water delivered is metered and
paid for on separate schedules and at a separate rate for water that is considered "commercial"
as distinguished from that which is considered "residential." According to the president of the
water company, Mark Nelson, who testified in this trial, the water serving this property is
"commercial" water owned on the books of the company by Howard and Ida Church and David
and Gloria Baldwin. The Churches are the parents of Mrs. Baldwin. Baldwins received title
to Churches' interest by a deed in May, 1995, and, therefore, presumably can have a new share
issued either in their names or in the name of the plaintiff.
22.

The water connections to the property were connected in the following

sequence:
a.

The old motel in approximately 1968.

b.

A mobile home, which preceded the home on the adjacent property to

the east of the subject property which was owned by the Churches.
c.

The service station which ultimately became the cafe.

It is reasonable that the water interest of the defendants, as represented by their stock
ownership in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, be divided between the plaintiff and
defendants, and it is reasonable that the defendants be required to secure a conveyance of such
interest to the plaintiff. It is further reasonable that until such time as the defendants can secure

a division of such share and a recognition of such right by the water company, the water
ownership of the share representation be awarded to and controlled by the plaintiff, and the
plaintiffs right to the water shall be superior to that of the defendants; however, it is reasonable
that the plaintiff be ordered not to interfere with the manner in which water is delivered to the
residence of the defendants through the property awarded to her herein, until an adequate
alternate source of water or alternate route for the service line to the defendants' residence can
be acquired.
23.

There is located upon the property certain underground storage tanks which may

violate state and federal environmental standards.

It is reasonable that the defendants be

required to remove such fixtures at their expense and bring the property in compliance with the
law. It is reasonable that the defendants be allowed until July 1, 1996, to remove the said tanks,
render the property environmentally safe, and comply with the law. Should the defendants' fail
to do so, and if the plaintiff should be required to do so, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
from the defendants the cost of bringing the property into compliance, together with all penalties
that may be assessed for failure to make a timely removal and compliance. It is reasonable that
the defendants be ordered to conduct such tank removal and land compliance requirements in
a prompt and orderly manner so as to interrupt and interfere with the plaintiffs use of the
property as little as possible.
24.

The plaintiff is entitled to prompt possession of the premises. It is reasonable

that the defendants be allowed thirty days within which to remove their property from the
8

premises, but it is further reasonable that they be ordered to return the premises to the plaintiff
in as good condition in which they received it in March of 1995.
25.

The parties, by stipulation, have agreed that the question of reasonable attorney

fees be tried to the Court in a separate evidentiary hearing to be conducted at a time and place
convenient to the Court and to the parties, and that the determination of the Court in this regard
be made part of the judgment and decree entered herein.
26.

It is reasonable that this decree and judgment be made final in accordance with

Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except for the questions reserved under paragraphs 17,
20, 21 and 22 of these findings. The Court shall reserve entering an amended judgment in this
case, based on a subsequent evidentiary hearing, should one be required to resolve the issues
reserved under such paragraphs, including the award of attorney fees and costs, which such seem
appropriate.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The issues pertaining to the claim of specific performance are equitable issues

and not legal issues and are reserved for the Court.
2.

The issues pertaining to the claim of specific performance were proved by

overwhelming evidence to the extent that reasonable men could not differ, and, therefore, even
if the jury were sitting in an advisory capacity, the Court, by clear and convincing evidence,
9

would be required to direct the jury to resolve such issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants, and, therefore, the Court entered judgment consistant with this conclusion
reserved for decision by the jury only certain issues of fact covered by separate jury instructions
and verdict forms found elsewhere in the file of this case.
3.

The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this Court ordering specific performance

by a deed conveying marketable title to the following described property:
Beginning 5 chains West of Sougheas corner of Section 26,
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North
240 fee; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87
acres.
4.

At all times during the tenure of the plaintiff as a tenant on the property of the

defendants, the defendant David Baldwin was the agent of Gloria Baldwin and his actions were,
in fact, the actions of himself and Gloria Baldwin.
5.

Because of partial performance and the written documents signed by the parties

to be charged, the statute of frauds is not an issue or a defense in this case.
6.

The parties are entitled to have a judgment and decree entered consistent with

the Court's Findings of Fact and the verdict reached by the jury, to wit $8,000.00 awarded to
the plaintiff.
7.

The Court concludes that the language in Exhibit No. 2 is consistent with an

option to purchase and inconsistent with a right of first refusal.
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8.

The relationship of the agreements, Exhibits 1 and 2, is ambiguous, and the

language of paragraph 3 of Exhibit 2 is ambiguous, and the Court has allowed parol evidence
on these issues to determine the intent of the parties; and the Court concludes as a matter of law
that Exhibits 1 and 2 are part of the same agreement, Exhibit 2 being a modification of Exhibit
1, and that paragraph 3 of Exhibit 2 was intended to grant to the plaintiff an option to purchase.
9.

The tender of the plaintiff was adequate and any objections that defendants may

have had to that tender were waived according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-3.
10.

At all times mentioned to the issues of this case, the defendant Gloria Baldwin

is estopped from denying that David Baldwin, her husband, was her agent.
11.

The water was appurtenant to the land and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a

conveyance of sufficient water to operate and maintain the property conveyed, which the Court
concludes as a matter of law to be one-half of that owned in the Boulder Farmstead Water
Company.
12.

It is reasonable that the plaintiff be awarded a Decree of Specific performance

requiring the defendants to convey to the plaintiff a good and sufficient marketable title to said
property.
13.

It is reasonable that the plaintiff and defendnat each pay one-half of the cost of

an owner's policy of title insurance.
14.

It is reasonable that the defendants be permitted to pay all delinquent taxes and

assessments within thirty days from the date of the decree herein, or if not within that time, the
11

plaintiff may be permitted to pay the said taxes and assessments at which point plaintiff will have
a right to a judgment for that amount.
15.

The plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees.

16.

The plaintiff is entitled to costs.

DATED this

day of December, 1995.
BY THE COURT

DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

TIMOTHY WILLARDSON, for:
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Defendants
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Pruvo, Utah 3*1603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (301) 377-4991

Our File No. 21,741

Attomevs for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADA JONES,
PARTIAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE
Plaintiff,
•-.,. Case No. 9306CC024
Judge Don V. Tibbs

vs.

DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA
BALDWIN,
Defendants.
This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
Judge, siting wuh an advisory jury en quesiions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on
maciers o:' law as distinguished from ix\^i:trz of equity; and ci:e Colin having convened on the
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having bra impaneled on the 27th day of
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis &
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their

attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court
having heard testimony, and having received evidence, and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above entitled
case.
The court now enters its Judgment and Decree:
1.

The plaintiff is awarded an order of specific performance ordering the

defendants to reconvey a good and sufficient marketable title to the plaintiff of the following
described property:
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26,
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87
acres.
2.

Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the cost of an Owner's policy of title

insurance.
3.

The plaintiff is to pay to the defendant the sum of $40,000.00 for said property

less $15,036.00 the amount of earned equity admitted by the defendants and less $8,000.00, the
amount of damages awarded by the jury.
.4.

The defendants are ordered to pay all delinquent taxes against said property.

5.

The plaintiff is awarded one-half of the water represented by the defendants'

water share or shares in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, and the defendants are ordered
to secure the transfer of such water to the plaintiff.
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6.

The defendants are ordered to bring the said property into compliance with State

and Federal requirements by July 1, 1996. This is to be done as quickly as possible and with
the least interruption in time and inconvenience as possible.
7.

The defendants are allowed until January 15, 1996, to remove their personal

property from the premises and they are ordered to restore said premises to the condition
existing when they took possession of said premises in March, 1995.
8.

The plaintiff is awarded possession on January 15, 1996.

9.

The court reserves jurisdiction to conduct evidentiary hearings on attorney fees,

environmental compliances, water rights, marketable title, and matters pertaining to the
designated subjects.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to costs.

DATED this / f

day of December, 1995.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this M ^

day of December, 1995.

Timothey Willardson
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle
IO885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), and
RICHARD W. DAYNES (5686), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778

Our File No. 21,741

Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADA JONES,
Plaintiff,

FIRST AMENDED PARTIAL
JUDGiMENT AND DECREE
Case No. 930600024
Judge Don V. Tibbs

vs.
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA
BALDWIN,
Defendants.

This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
Judge, sitting with an advisory jury on questions of equity and presiding at a trial by jury on
matters of law as distinguished from matters of equity; and the Court having convened on the
27th day of November, 1995, for the purpose of such trial, and the trial having continued
through November 28, 29, and 30, 1995; and a jury having ben impaneled on the 27th day of
November, which jury heard all factual questions; and the plaintiff having been represented by
her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Richard W. Daynes of the law firm of Howard Lewis &
Petersen; and the defendants having appeared in person and having been represented by their

attorney Timothy Willardson of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle; and the Court
having heard testimony, and the Court on the \y^^^ day of January, 1996, having received
evidence, and the Court having taken testimony and evidence on the issue of attorney fees and
receiving the bill of costs and affidavit of payment of taxes, now being fully advised in the
premises, makes and enters its Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree in the above entitled case.
THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND DECREE:
1.

The plaintiff is awarded an order of specific performance ordering the

defendants to convey a good and sufficient marketable title to the plaintiff of the following
described property:
Beginning 5 chains West of Southeast corner of Section 26,
Township 33 South, Range 4 East, and thence running North
240 feet; thence East 157 feet; thence South 240 feet; thence
West 157 feet to the point of beginning and containing .87
acres.
2.

Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the cost of an Owner's policy of title

insurance.
3.

The plaintiff is awarded $8,000.00 in damages as set forth by the jury;

$25,000.00 in attorney fees pursuant to the hearing of January 22, 1996 before this Court; and
$839.19 in costs pursuant to the Bill of Costs filed with this Court and $100.00 for the title
insurance. The commitment for title insurance cost $200.00 of which defendants were ordered
to pay half. The plaintiff is awarded $15,036.00 in earned equity admitted by the defendants.
2

The plaintiff has paid defendants' delinquent taxes together with penalties and interest and
plaintiff is entitled to judgment for those taxes which amount is $1,493.68. This amounts to a
total award of $50,468.87. This applied toward the purchase price and fair market value of
$40,000.00, for said property amounts to a remainder of $10,568.87 for which plaintiff is
awarded judgment bearing interest at the legal rate.
4.

The plaintiff is awarded one-half of the water represented by the defendants'

water share or shares in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company, and the defendants are ordered
to secure the transfer of such water to the plaintiff.
5.

The defendants are ordered to bring the said property into compliance with State

and Federal EPA and other environmental requirements by July 1, 1996. This is to be done as
quickly as possible and with the least interruption in time and inconvenience as possible.
6.

The defendants are allowed until January 15, 1996, to remove their personal

property from the premises and they are ordered to restore said premises to the condition
existing when they took possession of said premises in March, 1995.
7.

The plaintiff is awarded possession on January 15, 1996.

8.

The court reserves jurisdiction to conduct evidentiary hearings on attorney fees,

environmental compliances, water rights, marketable title, and matters pertaining to the
designated subjects.
9.

Plaintiff is entitled to costs.

10.

The retains jurisdiction to deal with issues remaining unresolved, in particular

those questions included in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above. In all other matters this judgment
shall be deemed final within the pursue of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

A.

day of February.
ay, 1996.

APPROVED AS TO FOR

5THY JvnGUET^Tt±AR^SON^ian___^
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE, P.C. ~ ~^
Attorney for Defendants
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ADDENDUM 1 5

INSTRUCTION NO.

a

/

INTRODUCTION
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your
attention during this trial.

I will now explain to you the rules

of law that you must follow and apply in deciding this case.
When I have finished you will go to the jury room and begin your
discussions, what we call your deliberations-

Please pay

attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you.

This

is an extremely important part of this trial.
You are not to single out one instruction alone as
stating the law, but must consider the instructions as a whole.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance
as to their relative importance.

If a direction or an idea is

stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is
intended and none must be inferred by you.

INSTRUCTION NO.

| (N

EXPERT WITNESS
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the
opinions of a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception

to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses.

Witnesses

who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in
some art, science, profession or calling, may state opinions as
to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an
expert, so long as it. is material and relevant to the case.

You

should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any,
given for it.

You are not bound by such an opinion.

weight you think it deserves.

Give it the

If you should decide that the

opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient
education and experience, or if you should conclude that the
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard
the opinion entirely.

INSTRUCTION NO.

J /

A

You are instructed that the Court has resolved the issues
pertaining

to the plaintiff's

claim

that

she

is entitled

to

specific performance. In that regard, the Court has found that the
plaintiff

is entitled to have the defendants

convey to her a

marketable title to the property which she had a right to purchase.
The Court has also made rulings on the issues of compliance with
State and Federal environmental requirements, and has resolved the
question of providing water to the premises. The Court has further
determined, as a matter of law, that the defendants were either
required to accept or reject the plaintiff's tender of $40,000.00,
and the Court finds that the
of May 7, 1993 was $40,000.00.

fair market value of the property as
The^eluie, tge~ToSrtriiare^

fehe--~f-a^rg—maorket—vai^tiQ of••• the—pxopesfty-was $40,0&0-H&K

The Court

will require that you answer only questions pertaining to the
plaintiff's damages, if any.

INSTRUCTION NO,

The

Court

shall

submit

the matter to you

solely

on

the

question of damages, if any, to be awarded the plaintiff.

In

considering what damages the plaintiff may have sustained in this
case, you may consider what profits, if any, the plaintiff may have
made during the period March 1995 through November 29, 1995, less
whatever income she received from other sources.

You may also

consider what other loss of income she may have been deprived of by
reason of the failure of the defendants to deliver possession, such
as the rental income from her home in Salt Lake City, if any, had
she not

been required

to

live

in said house because

of

her

inability to purchase the property in Boulder, Utah.
The Court has determined that the defendants have acknowledged
that the plaintiff has an accrued equity against the purchase price
of $15,036.00 as of July 31, 1994;

however, you may consider the

amount of increased equity she may have earned by reason of rental
payments from July 31, 1994 through December of 1994.
You may also consider damage, if any, she may have sustained
by reason of the taking of possession of the premises by the
defendants.
In considering damages, if any, you must bear in mind that
plaintiff has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of
the evidence and that the other instructions that I have given you
are to be followed in reaching such determination.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'y^

FAILURE TO PRODUCE STRONGER EVIDENCE

If you find that it was within the power of a party to
produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than that which
was offered on a material point, you may view with distrust any
weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually offered, unless
such failure is satisfactorily explained.

^

^

^

"
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INSTRUCTION NO,

/ ^

BURDEN OF PROOF
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the
burden of proof rests upon a certain party, I mean that unless
the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, you shall find that the same is not true.

If the

evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any
allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been
proved.

\'}Q

fiu\ -ecT^

INSTRUCTION NO.

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
The term "preponderance of the evidence'1 means that
evidence which, in your minds, seems to be of the greater weight;
the most convincing and satisfactory., The preponderance of the
evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the
amount of the testimony, but by the convincing character of the
testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you, the
jury.

INSTRUCTION NO

._^r

EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY
If you believe any witness has willfully testified
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the entire
testimony of witness, except as that witness may have been
corroborated by other credible evidence.

^

S

S^

INSTRUCTION NO.

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
You may believe that a witness, on some former
occasion, made statements inconsistent with that witness'
testimony given here in this case.
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to
entirely disregard the present testimony.

The effect of such

evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to
determine.

i(

INSTRUCTION NO.

n

CHARTS AND SUMMARIES
Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in
order to help explain the facts disclosed by the books, records,
and other documents which are in evidence in the case.

However,

such charts or summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or
proof of any facts.

If such charts or summaries do not correctly

reflect facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you
should disregard them.
In other words, charts or summaries are used only as a
matter of convenience.

If you find they are not in truth

summaries of facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case,
you are to disregard them entirely.

wWWS^

(K

INSTRUCTION NO.

RESORT TO CHANCE
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by
resorting to chance.

If you decide that,a party is entitled to

recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be
awarded.

It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to

take the independent estimate of each juror, then total the
estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the
average the amount of your award.

Each of you may express your

own independent judgment as to what the amount should be.

It is

your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test
them in the light of the law and the evidence and, after due
consideration, determine which, if any, of such individual
estimates is proper.

r, e

./'

C G<*f~*

INSTRUCTION NO.

a

SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION
This case must not be decided for or against anyone
because you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone.

It is your

sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law,
without regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice.

INSTRUCTION NO. '2-C

JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another
and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if your
individual judgment allows such agreement.

You each must decide

the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case
with your fellow jurors.

You should not hesitate to change an

opinion when convinced that it is wrong.

However, you should not

surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight
of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely
because of the opinion of the other jurors.

INSTRUCTION NO, ^ /
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is sometimes
done, but it will be your function to make findings of fact by answering special interrogatories
or questions which are submitted to you. In making your findings of act, you should bear in
mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be
true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Before you may answer "yes"
to any question submitted to you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence. The agreement of six of the jurors is required to answer any question, and at least
six of the jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes" before that answer
may be made.
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as a
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree.
As soon as you have answered the special interrogatories or questions, you shall have the special
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then shall return it to this room.
Instructions numbered 1 through

^X /

given to the jury this

3o

November, 1995.
BY THE COURT

DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

rt

day of
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR COUNTY OF
STATE OF UTAH

The H o n o r a b l e Don V. Tibbs
District Judge

ADA JONES
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
Plaintiff,
CASE N O .

930600024

-vs-

DAVID BALDWIN and
GLORIA BALDWIN
Defendant,
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
Attached hereto are jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , number 1 to
number
Dated this

, inclusive, as given by the Court in this case
day of

, 19

.

DON V . TIBBS
D I S T R I C T JUDGE

INSTRUCTION

NO.

/

It is the duty of this Court to i n s t r u c t you in the

law

t h a t a p p l i e s to this c a s e , and it is y o u r duty to follow the
regardless
exclusive

of what you believe it is or o u g h t to be.
right to determine the f a c t s

wei.gh the e v i d e n c e for that

It is y o u r

in the c a s e , and then

to

purpose.

You a u t h o r i t y must be e x e r c i s e d with s i n c e r e
sound

law,

judgment,

d i s c r e t i o n , and in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h these rules of law.

INSTRUCTION

NO.

y

The Court will be called upon to pass on the question
w h e t h e r or not offered e v i d e n c e m i g h t be a d m i t t e d .
not draw an i n f e r e n c e from my r u l i n g s .

You

of

should

W h e t h e r evidence is

adnnss

ible is a q u e s t i o n of law.
I do not determine what w e i g h t you should give e v i d e n c e ;
n o r the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s e s .
It is the duty of counsel
evidence

to o b j e c t when testimony or

is o f f e r e d , which he b e l i e v e s

is not

admissible.

other

INSTRUCTION

NO.

~>

You are the e x c l u s i v e j u d g e s of the c r e d i b i l i t y
witnesses

and the w e i g h t of the e v i d e n c e .

t a k e into c o n s i d e r a t i o n

the

You have a r i g h t

their bias, their interest

in the

of the suit, or any p r o b a b l e m o t i v e or lack t h e r e o f to
fairly,

of

to

result

testify

if any, is s h o w n .
You may c o n s i d e r the w i t n e s s e s 1

ableness

d e p o r t m e n t , the

of their s t a t e m e n t s , their a p p a r e n t

or the want of it, their o p p o r t u n i t y
u n d e r s t a n d , and their c a p a c i t y

to

or

candor,

to k n o w , t h e i r a b i l i t y

to

remember.

INSTRUCTION

In determining

frankness

reason-

NO.

the c r e d i b i l i t y

1

of a w i t n e s s y o u m a y

consider

any m a t t e r to prove or d i s p r o v e his t h r u t h f u l n e s s , i n c l u d i n g

the

following:
His demeanor and m a n n e r w h i l e
His capacity and o p p o r t u n i t y
communicate.

testifying.
to p e r c e i v e , r e c o l l e c t

or to

His character for h o n e s t y , v e r a c i t y , a b i a s , i n t e r e s t
other motive.

or

A statement p r e v i o u s l y m a d e by him that is c o n s i s t e n t
inconsistent with his t e s t i m o n y .

or

INSTRUCTION

NO.

'.;

You must not consider as e v i d e n c e any s t a t e m e n t
m a d e during the t r i a l ; however, if counsel
you will

of counsel

for the parties

regard that fact as being c o n c l u s i v e l y

As to any question to which an o b j e c t i o n

stipulate

proved.
was s u s t a i n e d , you

must not s p e c u l a t e as to what the a n s w e r m i g h t have been or as to
the reason for the

objection.

You must not consider any e v i d e n c e that was rejected
e v i d e n c e that was
A question

or any

stricken.
is not e v i d e n c e , and may be c o n s i d e r e d only as

it s u p p l i e s meaning to the a n s w e r .
INSTRUCTION N O .

>

You are not to decide an issue by the s i m p l e process
counting
The final

the number of witnesses that t e s t i f i e d

of

on the o p p o s i n g

sides

test is not the number of w i t n e s s e s , but in the c o n v i n c i n g

f o r c e of the

evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO. . 7

If, during this t r i a l , I say or do a n y t h i n g w h i c h s u g g e s t s to yoi
that I f a v o r the position of either p a r t y , d o n ' t be i n f l u e n c e d by such
suggestions.
I do not intend to indicate any o p i n i o n
prevail.

as to w h i c h party

You are the exclusive judge of the f a c t s .

should

INSTRUCTION NO.

I

This is an action to enforce a real estate contract. This action is brought by Ada Jones
against David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin. The plaintiff claims that she entered into a lease
agreement with the said defendants which agreement contained an option to purchase. She
contends that she entered upon the premises located in Boulder, Utah, and operated a cafe
thereon called the Burr Trail Cafe from the period of June 6, 1984, through the year 1994. The
plaintiff contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase in writing, by
giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such tender on the sole
basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff contends that the
defendants made no other objection to the tender. Immediately thereafter she brought this suit
for specific performance. The plaintiff further claims that in February, 1995, the defendants
ejected her from the premises and took dominion and control over the said property.
The plaintiff contends that she sustained damages by reason of the failure of the
defendants to promptly honor her election of her offer to purchase.
The plaintiff further contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase
in writing, by giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such
tender on the sole basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff
contends that the defendants made no other objection to the tender.
The defendants contend that the right of the plaintiff was not an option to purchase, but
rather, a first right of refusal in the event someone else purchased; and the defendants further

contend that the defendant Gloria Baldwin was not a party to the said agreement and never
consented to the agreement, and that the agreement is not binding upon her.
The defendants deny each and every claim of the plaintiff.
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Denver C. Snuffer #3031
Timothy Miguel Willardson # 4443
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle
10885 South State Street
Sandv, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OFUTAH
ADA JONES,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA BALDWIN,
Defendants.

Case No. 93-0600024
Hon. Don V. Tibbs

Please find attached Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions. Depending on the Court's standard
instructions, the proposed instructions of the plaintiff which the Court elects to give and the
evidence introduced at trial, defendant may propose additional instructions.

DATED:

Wednesday, November 22, 1995.

Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Defendants

DUTY OF THE COURT
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as jurors, to
follow the law as I state it to you, regardles^ot what you personally believe the law is or ought to
be. Even if you do not like the laws thaprtiust be applied, you must use them. On the other hand, it
is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the evidence
for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion
and honest deliberation.
References: MUJI 2.2,
JIFU No. 1.1 (195» x

It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that applies in thjs^ase, and it is your duty as
jurors to follow the law as the court states it to you, regardlessofwhat you personally believe the
law is or ought to be. On the other hand, it is your exclusjye'province to determine the facts in the
case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for thatjatlfpose.
References: BAJI-1
Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
People vs. Chadwich. 7 Utah 134, 25J&737, Hawlev v. Cory 9 UTAH 175, 33 p. 695.

The purpose of the coun's instruction is to instruct you as to the applicable law so that you may
arrive at a just and lawful verdict. Whether some instructions apply will depend upon what you
find to be the facts. Even though I have instructed you on various subjects you must not treat the
instructions as indicating the coun's opinion on how you should decide any issue in this case.
References* BAIT-^
Hillvard v.'Utah Bv Products Co.. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287.

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select on of your number to act as foreman, who will
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. This is a civil action and
six members of the jury may find and return a verdict./As soon as six or more of you shall have
agreed upon a verdict, you shall have it signed and dated by your foreman and then shall return it
to this room.
,/
/

Note: Rule 47(q) U.R.C.P. permits different/number to return verdict.
References: BAJI-9

You should not consider as evidence any statements of counsel made during the trial, unless such
statement was made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts.
You must not consider for any purpose any offer or evidence that was rejected, or any evidence
that was stricken out by the coun; such matter is to be treated as though you never had known it.
You are to decide this case solely upon the evidence that has been received by the court, and the
inferences that you may reasonably draw therefrom, and in accordance with the law as herein
stated.
References: BAJI 23
Arnett v. Scherer. 142 Ore. 494, 20JP.2d 803.

When an attempt is made to impeach a witness by showing that his general reputation in the
community where he resides for truth, honesty and integrity is bad, it is proper for you to consider
not only such evidence and all evidence of a contrary reputation, but also the fact, if it be a fact,
that among persons who know the witness, his reputation for truth, honesty and integrity has not
been discussed or questioned. The fact that a person's character in such respect has not been
questioned or discussed may support an inference of good reputation.
References: BAJI 34-C
State v. Hansen. 40 Utah 418, 122 P. 375; State v. Hougensen. 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229.

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witness and the weight of the evidence. In
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to take into
consideration their bias, their interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack
thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses deportment upon the
witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the
want of it, their opponunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember.
You should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements.
References: BAJI 28
Gittens v. Lundberg. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to take into
consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and am^friotive or lack of motive to testify
fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the reasonableness of
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor^of the want of it, their opportunity to know,
their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these matters you
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements.
References: MUJI 2.9
JIFUNo. 3.2 (1957)

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent with that
witness' testimony given here in this case.
/
That does not necessarily mean that you are^dquired to entirely disregard the present testimony.
The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine.
References: MUJI2.10
JEFUNos. 3.10, 3.11 (1957)

A witness may be impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honesty or integrity is bad or by evidence that on some former occasion he made
statements or conducted himself in a manner inconsistent with his present testimony. The effect, if
any, of impeachment upon the credibility of the'witness is for you to determine.
References: BAJI 34
Black v. Rockv Mtn. Bell Tel. Co.. 26#tah 451, 73 P. 514, 74-24-1 U.C.A., 1953.

EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated
by other credible evidence.
References: iMUJI2.ll
Gittens v. Lundbera, 3 Utah 2d 392,,284 P.2d 1115 (1955)
JIFU No. 3.12 (1957)
BAJI No. 2.22 (1986). Reprinted'with permission; copyright 1986 West Publishing Company

(~L

If you believe any witness has willfully,testified falsely as to any material matter, you may
disregard the entire testimony of suchr witness, except as he may have been corroborated by other
credible evidence.
References: BAJ1 27
Gitten v. Lundberg, 3 Utah'2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115.

3

If you should find that it was within the power or a party to produce stronger and more satisfactory
evidence than that which was offered on a material point, you may view with distrust any weaker
and less satisfactory evidence actually offered by him (or her) on that point, unless such failure is
satisfactorily explained.
References: BAJI 30
Cram v. Reynolds. 55 Utah 384. 186 P. 100.
Note: Care should be taken that the instruction is not so used that it may be construed to be a
comment on the evidence Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 P.2d 434.

BURDEN OF PROOF
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a certain party, or that
a party must prove a certain proposition, or that you.must find a certain proposition to be true, I
mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall
find that the same is not true.
References: MUJI2.16
JIFUNo. 2.1 (1957)

is

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
The term svpreponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds, seems to be
of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is
not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the
convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. If the
evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such
allegation has not been proved.
References: MUJI2.18
JIFUNo. 3.1 (1957)

iT

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greaterweight of the evidence, that is, such
evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, is more^convincing as to its truth.
References: BAJI21-A
/
Hickev v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co.. 29 Utah"392. 82 P. 29; Alvardo v. Tucker. 2 Utah 2d
16, 268 P.2d 986.

a

CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the witnesses, and
have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted into evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you in
arriving at your verdict. You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made
during trial.
References: MUJI 2.4
JIFU No. 3.6 (1957)

You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the evidence you
are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you are not limited to what
you see and hear the witnesses testify to. You are permitted to draw, from facts which you find
have been proved, such reasonable inferences as seem justified in the light of your experience.
Inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw
from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.
Unless and until outweighed by evidence in the case to the contrary, you may find that official duty
has been regularly performed; that private transactions have been fair and regular; that the ordinary
course of business or employment has been followed; that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life; and that the law has been obeyed.

n

I have not intended by anything I have said or done, or by any questions that I have asked, to
suggest how you should decide any questions of fact, or that I believe or disbelieve any witness.
If anything I have done or said has seemed so to indicate, you must disregard it and form your
own opinion.
References: BAJI 23
Amett v. Scherer. 142 Ore. 494. 20 P.2d 803.

PROVINCE OF JURY
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or another in this
case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict. It would be
improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot participate in
that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done if it made you
think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over another, or that I
considered any piece of evidence more important than another.
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just verdict
based upon the facts and the evidence.
References: MUJI 2.6
JIFUNo. 1.4(1957)

<£

ATTITUDE AND CONDUCT OF JURORS
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not be
productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of your
opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this
matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascenainment and declaration
of the truth and the administration of justice.
References: MUJI 2.7
JIFU No. 1.8 (1957)

x^

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition. You are not to
discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a deposition. It is
entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared.
References: MUJI2.12
JIFUNo. 3.3 (1957)
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STATEMENT OF OPINION
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be based on
actual knowledge. In determining whether a particular statement was a statement of fact or merely
an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which it was
made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words used. You
may also consider the relationship of the parties and the subject matter with which the statement
was concerned.
References: MUJI2.13
BAJI No. 9.51 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright 1986 West Publishing Company
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EXPERT WITNESS
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as evidence.
An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by education,
study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, may state
opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long as it is
material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any,
given for it. You are not bound by such air opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves. If you
should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient education and
experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinions are not
sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion
entirely.
References: MUJI2.14
JIFU No. 3.7 (1957)
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 72.08 (1987 & Supp. 1991). Reprinted with permission;
copyright 1987 West Publishing Company

^

TAKING OF NOTES
I have noticed that some of you have been taking notes during the testimony. The use of notes in
the jury room to refresh your memory is perfecdy acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely
excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict independently, after consultation with
the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own memory of the evidence. One juror's
opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes.
References: MUJI 2.20

JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide the case for
yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate
to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not surrender your
honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.
References: MUJI 2.25
JDFUNo. 1.7 (1957)

RESORT TO CHANCE
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide that a
party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded. It
would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, then
total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amount of your
award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount should
be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light of the law
and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such individual
estimates is proper.
References: MUJI 2.26
JIFUNo. 1.13 (1957)

ISSUES IN THE CASE
The plaintiff claims that the plaintiff and the defendant have a contract, and that as a result of the
defendant's failure to perform the defendant's obligations under the contract, the plaintiff suffered
loss in one or more of the following respects:
1)
On the May 7, 1993, Ms. Jones informed Mr. Baldwin that she was going to buy thenproperty. In June, 1993, Ms. Jones received a letter from Mr. Baldwin stating that the property
would not be sold. Ms. Jones claims that she is entitled to specific performance of the sales
agreement and a conveyance to her of the premises, including appurtenances at a price of fair
market value, which are implicit in the agreement; and
2)
The lease option agreement is ambiguous and should be rewritten, in favor of Ms. Jones
(because Mr. Baldwin wrote the lease document) to remove what was written and substitute words
that require that (a) whether or not the property is sold is up to Ms. Jones, (b) the purchase price
will be $40,000 unless two out of three appraisers (with Baldwins paying half) agree on a different
price, (c) the sale must be done within 30 days after a price is set, (d) price will be paid in cash
within 30 days after the price is fixed, (e) Baldwins must guaranty that Ms. Jones gets clear title
with no encumbrances, (f) each side has to pay half the cost of a survey to determine what property
is being sold, and (g) Ms. Jones gets the water rights for the property; and
3)
Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin have breached the existing agreement to sell the property and Ms.
Jones should be able to recover all of the profits and equity that she has lost by Baldwins taking
back their property; and
4)
Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin promised Ms. Jones that she could buy the property that she was
leasing knowing that Ms. Jones would rely on that promise. Ms. Jones did rely on the promise
and has been hurt because she made lease payments and improvements on the property that she
would not have made without the promise, so Baldwins should have to sell their property and also
pay Ms. Jones money for whatever damages she proves at trial; and
5)
Ms. Jones gave the Baldwins a benefit in the form of improvements and in increased
business and goodwill, Baldwins were aware of the benefit they were receiving, Baldwins have
retained those benefits after promising Ms. Jones that she could purchase the property. Under the
circumstances, to allow defendants to retain, without payment, the improvements and increased
business and goodwill of the cafe which was produced by plaintiff would be unfair.
The defendant denies that the defendant did any of the things claimed by the plaintiff or that the
defendant acted improperly, or that the defendant's claimed actions or omissions were a legal cause
of the plaintiffs claimed loss.
The defendant further claims that:
1)
It would be unfair to take their property away from them under the circumstances in this
case; and
2)
The agreement on which Ms. Jones seeks to rely is covers so few of the crucial points
necessary to an agreement to sell property that it would be unfair to enforce it and a contract; the
thing that Ms. Jones is relying on is just an agreement to agree on something if a sale is considered
in the future; and
3.
Because sales of land are so important, agreements about land sales must be fully written
down. This was not so it is not enforceable; and
4.
Ms. Jones waited to tell Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin that she thought she could force a sale of
their property until it was too late for Baldwins to correct her, so that it would be unfair to make
Baldwins sell their property: and
5.
Ms. Jones has not given Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin anything of value that would compensate
for an agreement to sell their home and property; and

6.
Ms. Jones has, by waiting, or by her other actions, given up the right to insist that the
property be sold.
The defendant further denies that the plaintiff sustained damages.
References: MUJI26.1
IJI § 10.01.
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EXISTENCE OF VALID CONTRACT
You are being asked to decide whether the plaintiff and the defendant had a valid contract for sale
of Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin's home and their other property.
A contract is an agreement between two or more competent parties for the performance of a specific
act. It can also be an agreement not to do a certain act.
To find the existence of a valid contract, you must find that all of the following occurred:
1. The plaintiff made an offer to the defendant; and
2. The defendant accepted the offer; and
3. Each party gave something of value in return for what the party received.
References: MUJI 26.2
IJI § 10.2. Reprinted with permission: copyright 1991Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
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SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS
A contract may consist of several documents, several verbal agreements, or both.
If you find that the second lease agreement refers to and describes the first lease agreement or the
requirements of the water district or the environmental agencies, and you find that the plaintiff and
the defendant intended to include those requirements as part of their agreement, then you may
consider it to be a part of the contract.
References: MUJI 26.5
IJI § 10.06.

OFFER
An offer is a definite proposal to enter into a specific contract upon acceptance by the person
receiving the offer.
References: MUJI 26.7
Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Irving Place Assocs., Inc., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1979)
IJI §§ 10.21, 10.22.

^

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
To find that the plaintiff and the defendant had a valid contract, you must find that:
1. The plaintiff communicated an offer to the defendant; and
2. The defendant accepted the offer and communicated the acceptance to the plaintiff.
Unless a particular mode of acceptance is specified by the offer, the acceptance does not need to be
express or formal. Acceptance may be shown by writing, words, or conduct that indicates
agreement to the offer.
References: MUJI 26.6
Walters v. National Beverages, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 301, 422 R2d 524 (1967)
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952)
Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30 (1979)
IJI § 10.20.

REVOCATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF OFFER
An offer made by one pany may be withdrawn at any time prior to its acceptance by the other
party. Therefore, if you find the defendant withdrew or revoked the defendant's offer prior to the
plaintiffs acceptance of the offer, or prior to the time the offer had been communicated to the
plaintiff, then you must find that no valid contract was formed.
References: MUJI 26.8
IJI § 10.23.

LAPSE OF OFFER
If an offer does not specify a limited time by which it may be accepted, a contract may be formed
only if the offer is accepted within a reasonable time.
Therefore, if you find the offer does not specify a time limit for acceptance, and the offer was in
fact accepted within a reasonable time, you must find that a valid contract was formed. However, if
you find that the offer was not accepted within a reasonable time, then you must find that the offer
had expired and that a contract had not been formed.
References: MUJI 26.9
IJI § 10.24.

ACCEPTANCE
To find that the defendant accepted the offer, you must find that the defendant did one of the
following:
'&•

1. Communicated the defendant's acceptance to the plaintiff; or
2. Performed the acts that the offer specified. Unless the offer specifies otherwise, acceptance of
an offer may be made in writing, by spoken words, by actions, or by any other conduct that
indicates an agreement to the terms of the offer.
If you find that the defendant did not accept the offer, then you must find that no contract was
formed. If you find that the defendant did accept the offer, then you must go on to consider the
other issues.
References: MUJI26.10
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971)
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50 (1979)
IJI § 10.30.
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COUNTEROFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
For a binding contract to be formed, an offer must be accepted in its entirety. An offer cannot be
accepted in pan and rejected in pan.
If you find that the defendant proposed new terms, or rejected some terms of the offer, then you
must find that a contract was not formed, but rather that the defendant made a counteroffer.
However, if you find that the plaintiff accepted the terms of the defendant's counteroffer, then you
must find that a contract was formed.
References: MUJI26.11
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971)
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 58 (1979)
IJI § 10.32.

REJECTION OF OFFER
As soon as the offeree rejects the entire offer, or any of its terms, an offer terminates. Once
rejected, the offer may not be accepted later.
References: MUJI 26.12
IJI § 10.33.
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CONSIDERATION
If you find that the plaintiff did not give or agree to give the Baldwins something valuable, in
addition to what Ms. Jones had to give them under the lease, then you must find that there was no
contract for sale of the propeny. If you find that the plaintiff did give or agree to give the Baldwins
something valuable, in addition to what Ms. Jones had to give them under the lease, then you must
go on to consider the other issues.
References: MUJI 26.14
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)
Latimer v. Holladay, 103 Utah 152, 134 P.2d 183 (1943)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §71(1979)
IJI § 10.50.

4/

NEGOTIATIONS
If the parties are merely negotiating the terms of an agreement, no contract has been formed. A
contract is formed only if the parties have agreed to all of the essential elements of the agreement.
Therefore, if you find that the parties had not reached agreement on any material term, you must
find that no contract was formed.
References: MUJI 26.16
IJI § 11.10.

AGREEMENT TO ALL MATERIAL TERMS
The burden of proving that both parries agreed as to all material terms and conditions is on Ms.
Jones, because she is the party claiming that there is a contract to sell the property. Therefore, if
you find that the parties had not reached agreement on any material term, you must find that no
contract was formed.
References: B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972)
Cal Wadsworth Construction v.City of St. George, 1995 WL 364067 (Utah 1995)
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1992)
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DEFINITION OF "MATERIAL" TERM
An element or term of a contract is a material term of a contract if a reasonable person would not
have made the contract unless a promise regarding that action or duty had been included.
References: MUJI 26.40

^

ASSENT TO DIFFERENT TERMS
A contract is formed only if the parties have completely assented to identical terms. Therefore, if
you find that the parties did not come to a complete understanding and agreement on any of the
material terms of the contract, then you must find that no contract was formed.
References: MUJI 26.17
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 714 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1979)
m § li.ii.

IS

MUTUAL MISTAKE
When both parties, at the time of entering into a contract, share a mutual mistaJce about an
assumption or a fact upon which they based the contract, and such assumption or fact has a
material effect on the agreed performance, the contract is voidable.
A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts.
When a contract is voidable, either party may choose to have the contract declared void.
References: MUJI 26.18
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 151, 152 (1979)

UNILATERAL MISTAKE, WHEN VOIDABLE
A unilateral mistake is a mistake made by only one of the two parties to a contract. When the
following four elements have been established, the contract may be voided:
1. The unilateral mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract as actually
made would be unconscionable.
2. The matter as to which the unilateral mistake was made must relate to a material feature of the
contract.
3. Generally, the unilateral mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake.
4. It must be possible to give relief by way of rescinding the contract without serious prejudice to
the other party, except the loss of the pany's bargain. In other words, it musfbe possible to return
the party to the situation that existed before entering into the contract.
References: iVIUJI 26.19
John Call Ens'g v. Manti City Corp., 743 R2d 1205 (Utah 1987)
Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968)

SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
The plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff substantially performed the plaintiffs obligation to pay
rent, insure the property, maintain the property, arid all of the other significant items in the lease
agreement. Proof of substantial performance means that the plaintiff must prove all of the
following:
1. That the plaintiff performed substantially all of what the contract required.
2. That the plaintiffs performance was so nearly equivalent to what was bargained for that it
would be unreasonable, based on all the facts and circumstances, to deny the plaintiff the payment
of the contract price, less any damages for the plaintiffs failure to perform the remainder of the
contract terms.
3. That the plaintiff acted in good faith, and did not intentionally fail to comply with the terms of
the contract.
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all three of these items, then you must find that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover the contract price from the defendant, less any amount owing to the defendant
resulting from the plaintiffs failure to perform all of the plaintiffs obligations under the contract.
If you find that the plaintiff has not proved all of these items, then you must find the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover the agreed contract price from the defendant'.
References: MUJI 26.21
IJI § 12.02.

BREACH
To prevail on the plaintiffs claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
breached the defendant's obligation under the contract by failing to give Ms. Jones the right of first
refusal when Baldwins were ready, willing, and able to sell both the business and their home.
References: MUJI 26.22
IJI § 12.03.

"CONDITION" DEFINED
The obligation of a pany is conditional when the party's duty to perform the obligation depends
the happening of an event, the occurrence of which may either be certain or uncenain.
References: MUJI 26.26
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 (1979)
IJI § 12.70.

CONDITION PRECEDENT
The defendant was not obligated to allow Ms. Jones to purchase their property until Mr. and Mrs.
Baldwin had received a bona fide offer to purchase that property which they were ready, willing
and able to accept. To prevail in the plaintiffs claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove
that Baldwins had received a bona fide offer to purchase that property which they were ready,
willing and able to accept that offer and that Baldwins then failed to allow Ms. Jones to purchase
the property.
References: MUJI 26.27
IJI§ 12.71.

"D

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE
The particular time of performance is not critical unless it is made so either by the express
agreement of the parties or by the circumstances of the case. If the contractual obligation can be
performed as well at one time as another, time is not critical. On the other hand, time is critical if,
because of the subject matter or terms of the contract, or due to fluctuations in value, one party will
incur substantial injury or financial loss due to delayed performance by the other unless time is
treated as critical. If it is critical that performance take place at the agreed time, a late performance
or offer of performance may be rejected.
You must therefore decide whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant or the
circumstances of this case required the plaintiff to pay rent, maintain the buildings, and do the other
things required in the lease within the time specified in the contract. If you decide timely
performance by the plaintiff was critical, you must find that late performance by the plaintiff could
properly be rejected by the defendant. If you decide it was not critical the plaintiff perform within
the time specified in the contract, you must find that any reasonable delay in the plaintiffs
performance did not give the defendant the right to reject that performance.
References: MUJI 26.28
IJI § 12.90.

REASONABLE TIME FOR PERFORMANCE
If a contract does not specify a time by which an act is to be done, the act must be performed
within a reasonable time.
In determining whether the plaintiff paid her rent, maintained the property, and did the other things
she was required to do within a reasonable time, you must consider the situation of the parties, the
nature of the transaction, and the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs performance. If you
find the plaintiff completed her performance within a reasonable time, you must find the plaintiff
performed the plaintiffs obligations under the contract.
References: MUJI 26.29
IJI§ 12.92.

DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
Whether expressed or not, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing with respect to dealings between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal fairly and
honestly with each other. Nevenheless, this duty of good faith and fair dealing does not create any
implied obligations contradictory to the express provisions of the contract. Also, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing does not mean that a party is obligated to exercise any of the party's contract
rights to the party's own detriment for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract.
References: MUJI 26.30
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980)
Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carner Corp., 753 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205

VALID OFFER TO PERFORM REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT
A valid offer to perform requires an offer to perform everything required by the contract. It is not
enough to offer to do only pan of what is required, unless performance under subsequent pans of
the contract is conditioned on performance and acceptance of preceding pans of the contract.
References: MUJI 26.32
IJI § 12.101. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.

VALID OFFER TO PERFORM REQUIRES PRESENT ABILITY TO PERFORM
An offer to perform has no effect if the person making it is unable or unwilling to perform
according to the offer. This means that at the time performance was supposed to take place, the
plaintiff must have been in control of resources by which the plaintiff could in fact have performed
if called on to do so or the plaintiffs offer is of no effect.
References: MUJI 26.33
IJI § 12.108. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.

DUTY TO PERFORM CONDITIONED ON NO UNCURED MATERIAL FAILURE
If there is an uncured material failure by a party to render performance due at an earlier time, the
other party shall have no duty to perform under the parties' contract.
References: MUJI 26.39
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 116
(Utah 1980)
McCarren v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1979)
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PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY MATERIAL BREACH
The defendant contends the defendants were excused from performing the defendant's remaining
obligations under the contract because of the plaintiffs conduct in failing to pay suppliers, failing
to pay for maintenance, failing to pay rent in full and on time and all of the other failures that Ms.
Jones had on her side. In order to establish this as a justification for not performing the defendant's
remaining obligations under the contract, the defendant must prove the plaintiff breached an
important part of what the plaintiff had promised to do. An action or duty is an important part of a
party's performance under a contract if a reasonable person would not have made the contract
unless a promise regarding that action or duty had been included. That is, the defendant would be
excused from performing if the plaintiffs conduct in failing to pay rent, failing to pay for
improvements, and other failures by Ms. Jones related to an essential part of the agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the plaintiff breached only a minor or
unimportant pan of the contract, the defendant would not be excused from performing.
Consequently, if you find that the plaintiffs conduct was the type of breach that had something to
do with an essential part of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, you must find
that the defendants were excused from further performance under the contract. If you find that the
plaintiffs conduct was unimportant in relation to what the plaintiff had promised to perform, you
must find the defendant was required to continue to perform.
References: MUJI 26.40
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243 (1979)
IJI § 12.126. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.

ELEMENTS OF A MATERIAL BREACH
In determining whether a failure to perform or offer to perform is material, the following factors
are significant:
1. The extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which the party reasonably
expected;
2. The extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that benefit;
3. The extent to which the non-performing party will suffer forfeiture;
4. The likelihood that the non-performing party will cure the failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
5. The extent to which the behavior of the non-performing party compons with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.
References: MUJI 26.41
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979)
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PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE
The defendant contends the defendant was excused from performing the defendant's obligations
under the contract because the plaintiff prevented the defendant from performing. You must
therefore decide if the plaintiff in any way hindered or obstructed the defendant from performing
the defendant's part of the bargain. That is, you must determine both of the following:
1. Whether the defendant was ready, willing and able to perform the defendant's obligations under
the contract; that is, whether, at the time the defendant's performance was supposed to take place,
the defendant was in control of, or possessed the resources by which the defendant could in fact
have performed.
2. Whether, in addition, the defendant would have performed the defendant's obligations under
the contract, but the plaintiffs conduct in failing to wait for Baldwins to be ready, willing, and able
to sell and have a bona fide offer that was acceptable to them prevented or made it impossible for
the defendant to perform.
If you find the defendant was ready, willing and able to perform but was prevented from doing so
because of the plaintiffs conduct, you must find the defendant was excused from performing.
However, if you find either that the defendant was not ready, willing and able to perform the
defendant's pan of the contract, or the plaintiffs conduct did not actually prevent or render it
impossible for the defendant to perform, the defendant was not excused from performing.
References: MUJI 26.42
IJI § 12.127. Reprinted with permission; copyright 1991 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
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PERFORMANCE EXCUSED BY PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PERFORM OR OFFER TO
PERFORM
As a defense to the defendant's nonperformance under this agreement, the defendant claims that the
defendant's promised performance and the plaintiffs performance were essential to and dependent
on each other. In other words, the defendant claims that because the plaintiff did not perform or
offer to perform as required by the contract, the defendant was not required to perform.
For the defendant to prevail on this issue, you must find: (1) that the defendant's performance was
dependent on the plaintiffs performance; and (2) that the plaintiff did not perform or make a valid
offer to perform the plaintiffs contractual obligations. If the plaintiff did not perform or offer to
perform, the plaintiff cannot recover under the contract.
References: MUJI 26.43
IJI § 13.03.

MITIGATION
Damages are not recoverable for loss the plaintiff could have avoided without undue risk, burden
or humiliation. The plaintiff is not precluded from recovery, however, to the extent the plaintiff has
made reasonable but unsuccessful effons to avoid loss.
References: MUJI 26.50
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1979)

DAMAGES: FORESEEABLE
Damages are recoverable for loss the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of the
breach when the contract was made.
Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it:
1. Is one that ordinarily follows the breach of such contract in the usual course of events; or
2. Is a result of special circumstances not in the ordinary course of events, in which a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would have known that loss would result from the breach.
References: MUJI 26.51
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 (1979)
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DAMAGES: REASONABLE CERTAINTY
Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established
with reasonable certainty.
References: MUJI 26.52
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1979)

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH
Every contract imposes upon the parties an obligation of good faith in its performance. Good faith
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Honesty in fact is an honest belief.
It is not required that the belief be reasonable, so long as it is an honest belief.
References: MUJI26.100
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1990)
State Bank v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977)

FORMATION OF CONTRACT
^Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. A contract for the sale of goods is
enforceable if the circumstances of the transaction are sufficient to show an agreement. The nature
of the bargain can be determined by the words used by the parties, earlier dealings between the
parties, commonly understood customs and practices in the trade or business, and the subsequent
conduct of the parties in carrying out the agreement in question. A contract does not fail for
indefiniteness because there is uncertainty as to one or more terms. However, the contract cannot
be so vague or ambiguous that no reasonable basis exists for enforcing it against one party or the
other.
References: MUJI 26.101
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 (1990)
Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977)
Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1978)

COURSE OF PERFORMANCE
In contracts involving repeated performances by either parry, the terms of the contract may be
construed or supplemented by the course of performance between the parties. The course of
performance is the manner in which the parties have-treated each other and interpreted the contract
previously.
References: MUJI 26.103
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1990)

COURSE OF DEALING
In contracts involving repeated performances by either party, the-terms of the contract may be
construed or supplemented by evidence of a prior course of dealing between the parties. A course
of dealing between parties is the previous conduct of the parties in prior dealings, which
establishes a common basis of understanding for interpreting each other's conduct and suggests an
understanding as to how a party's actions may be interpreted by another party.
/

References: MUJI 26.104
/
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1990)
Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's Elec. Con&tr. Co., 765 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

\/-\

FAIR MARKET VALUE DEFINED
The fair market value of propeny is defined as the price at which a fully informed, willing owner
would have voluntarily sold and a fully informed, willing buyer would have voluntarily bought the
property in question.
References: MUJI 27.19
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969)
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269
(1952)

DAMAGE INSTRUCTIONS CAUTION
The fact that I have instructed you concerning damages is not to be taken as an indication that I
either believe or do not believe that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages. The
instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in case you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. However, if you determine that there should be
no recovery, then you will entirely disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of
damages.
References: MUJI 27.21
JEFU No. 90.90 (1957)
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SECRETARY

INSTRUCTION NO,

This is an action to enforce a real estate contract. This action is brought by Ada Jones
against David Baldwin and Gloria Baldwin. The plaintiff claims that she entered into a lease
agreement with the said defendants which agreement contained an option to purchase. She
contends that she entered upon the premises located in Boulder, Utah, and operated a cafe
thereon called the Burr Trail Cafe from the period of June 6, 1984, through the year 1994. The
plaintiff contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase in writing, by
giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such tender on the sole
basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff contends that the
defendants made no other objection to the tender. Immediately thereafter she brought this suit
for specific performance. The plaintiff further claims that in February, 1995, the defendants
ejected her from the premises and took dominion and control over the said property.
The plaintiff contends that she sustained damages by reason of the failure of the
defendants to promptly honor her election of her offer to purchase.
The plaintiff further contends that on May 7, 1993, she exercised her option to purchase
in writing, by giving the defendants notice of said election, and the defendants rejected such
tender on the sole basis that they could not provide culinary water to the premises. The plaintiff
contends that the defendants made no other objection to the tender.
The defendants contend that the right of the plaintiff was not an option to purchase, but
rather, a first right of refusal in the event someone else purchased; and the defendants further

contend that the defendant Gloria Baldwin was not a party to the said agreement and never
consented to the agreement, and that the agreement is not binding upon her.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You, as jurors in this case, are sitting in an advisory capacity to the Court in matters
of specific performance. That means that the question of whether the agreement is binding upon
the parties is a legal question which the Court will resolve, and the question of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants specifically perform the option agreement, if any in
the agreement, is a matter for the Court to resolve, even though the Court may submit that
question to you at a later date for your advice on the issue; however the ultimate decision
regarding whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the contract specifically enforced in terms of
conveyance to her of the property described in the so-called option agreement will be a decision
for the Court.
In the event the Court finds that there is reason to believe that the defendants caused the
plaintiff damage by reason of their failure to convey the property in a prompt and timely manner
after an exercise of the option to purchase, then you will be required to determine what
damages, if any, the plaintiff sustained by reason of the failure of the defendants to honor the
Plaintiffs tender of May 7, 1993.

INSTRUCTION NO.

In considering what damages the plaintiff may have sustained in this case, you may
consider what profits the plaintiff may have made during the period of May 7, 1993, through
November 10, 1995, less whatever income she received from other sources. You will also
consider what other loss of income she may have been deprived of by reason of the failure of
the defendants to deliver possession, such as the rental income from her home in Salt Lake City
had she not been required to live in the said house because of her inability to purchase the
property in Boulder, Utah. You may also consider as offsets to her profits the fact that she did
not have to pay rent on the said premises for the year of 1995, but at the same time, she did not
have to pay interest on the money she would have borrowed to purchase the said property,
consequently, the payment of rent and the payment of interest to some extent are offsetting sums
and you may calculate what offsets if any should be allowed.
You may also consider the question of the reasonable value of the premises on the date
of the tender vis-a-vis the reasonable value of the premises on November 10, 1995, bearing in
mind that the premises were an operating business known as the Burr Trail Cafe, and that the
economics of the locale may have been adversely affected by other businesses that may have
been attracted to the locale by reason of the absence of the business as operated by the plaintiff,
giving regard to her expertise and the good will established by her eleven years of previous
operations. In other words, the difference between the value of the premises on May 7, 1993,

and the value of the premises on November 10, 1995, if there is in fact a diminution value,
would be damages to the plaintiff.

INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
what, if any, negligent conduct the defendant committed, and that such negligence, if any, was
a proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence what damages, if any, she has sustained as a result
of the defendants' negligent conduct, if any.

INSTRUCTION NO,

"Burden of proof1 means the burden of persuasion. A party who has the burden of
proof must persuade you that his claim is more probably true than not true. In determining
whether he has met this burden, you will consider all the evidence, whether produced by the
plaintiff or defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO.

By a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is used in these instructions, is meant
that which to your minds is of the greater weight. The evidence preponderates to the side
which, to your minds, seems to be the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance
of the evidence is not alone determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the
testimony, but the convincing character of the testimony weighed by the impartial minds of the
jury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Damage is approximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, wherever it appears from
the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the damage; and that damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.

INSTRUCTION NO.

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received
as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if
in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.

INSTRUCTION NO.

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received
as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if
in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.

INSTRUCTION NO.
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is sometimes
done, but it will be your function to makefindingsof fact by answering special interrogatories
or questions which are submitted to you. In making your findings of act, you should bear in
mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be
true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Before you may answer "yes"
to any question submitted to you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence. The agreement of six of the jurors is required to answer any question, and at least
six of the jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes" before that answer
may be made.
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as a
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree.
As soon as you have answered the special interrogatories or questions, you shall have the special
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then shall return it to this room.
Instructions numbered 1 through

given to the jury this

November, 1995.
BY THE COURT

DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
J:\JHUONES.INS

day of

